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ABSTRACT 
 
Prior literature documents that auditor style increases financial statement 
comparability, implicitly making financial statements more useful to outsiders. Auditor 
style results from policies and procedures that centralize decision-making within the audit 
firm. A potential hazard of centralized decision-making is the propagation of decision 
errors throughout the entity. I predict, and find evidence to suggest, that auditor style is 
associated with a set of common disclosure deficiencies among clientele as measured by 
receipt of similar SEC comment letters. Clients also converge in both style and disclosure 
deficiencies as auditor tenure increases. Further, after changing auditors, clients appear to 
assume the style and disclosure deficiencies of the subsequent auditor. These results 
provide the first evidence that auditor style, while potentially a net benefit to users of the 
financial statements, has potential costs as well. 
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1. Introduction 
The use of firm-wide policies and procedures in auditing firms is a form of centralized 
decision-making in which audit decisions are taken out of the hands of auditors (from the 
associate to the partner level) and placed in the hands of the policy writer. The merits of 
centralized and decentralized decision-making have been discussed extensively in the 
economics and management literature since Hayek (1945). A noted feature of centralized 
decision-making is it may lead to fewer decision errors, but when decision errors do occur 
they are global and propagate throughout the entity (Arcuri and Dari‐Mattiacci 2010). In 
the context of the modern auditing firm, a myriad of audit decisions are made by the firm’s 
methodology group, which is presumably best able to make such decisions. Decision 
errors, defined in this study as a disclosure position deemed deficient by a regulator, are 
likely minimized in this structure. However, errors that do occur may be global and 
propagate throughout the audit firm. This propagation would cause the error to be repeated 
at each audit client, thus potentially creating a set of disclosure deficiencies common to 
many clients of the auditor. 
This study investigates whether auditor style, measured by the presence of a common 
audit firm, is associated with common disclosure deficiencies among audit clients, 
measured by receipt of similar SEC comment letters. I use the concept of auditor style 
developed by Francis, Pinnuck, & Watanabe (2014), hereafter FPW, in which firm-wide, 
often proprietary, sets of policies and procedures direct the way audits are performed and 
lead to financial statements that are more comparable within an audit firm than across audit 
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firms.1 These internal policies and procedures centralize decision making within the audit 
firm and potentially enhance the scope of decision errors.   
Decision centralization, and therefore the potential for global level errors, occurs in 
virtually every aspect of the audit. I focus on decision errors related to financial statement 
disclosures, taken from SEC comment letters, because disclosures and the SEC comment 
letter setting have unique advantages that make them ideal for testing whether centralized 
decision-making is associated with global level errors. One, disclosure deficiencies can be 
attributed to the auditor in much the same way that deficiencies in the financial statements 
can. Auditing standards require the auditor to audit the footnote disclosures and review the 
management discussion and analysis (MD&A) to ensure the discussion matches the 
financial statements/disclosures (AU Sections 550 and 551). Thus, auditors are responsible 
for providing assurance over the footnote disclosures (and to a lesser extent the MD&A) 
in the same way they are responsible for assurance over the income statement, statement 
of cash flows and balance sheet. Relatedly, in the auditing literature, disclosure deficiencies 
are becoming a relatively well-accepted indicator of an audit deficiency (e.g., Glover, 
Hansen, & Seidel 2015). Moreover, professional auditors in a survey listed SEC comment 
letters and enforcement actions (second only to restatements) as a useful indicator of audit 
deficiencies (Christensen et al. 2015). Thus, academics and practitioners alike generally 
accept disclosure deficiencies as indicators of a decision error on the part of the auditor. 
Two, comment letters are much more common than many other audit quality proxies. For 
                                                 
1 Policies and procedures can take many forms and may not literally be called a “policy” or “procedure” 
in practice. For example, the accounts receivable audit program is an example of a policy with respect to how 
accounts receivable should be audited, although the word policy is never used. Policies and procedures also 
need not be formally written down. Informal company norms may represent a very rigid company policy. I 
use the term policies and procedures broadly to encompass all methods by which employee behavior is 
guided, constrained and standardized. 
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a given three-year period (the amount of time it takes to ensure a firm is reviewed at least 
once by the SEC) anywhere from 63 to 77 percent of clients receive at least one comment 
letter (Cassell, Dreher, and Myers 2013). In contrast, the vast majority of clients go through 
any given three-year period without ever receiving a going concern opinion, an AAER, or 
announcing a restatement. Three, comment letters provide the researcher with very specific 
information about the issues that created the deficiency. Audit Analytics provides six issue 
types and 215 individual issue keys. This allows a researcher to identify common 
deficiencies in comment letters at a very detailed level. Four, comment letter reviews have 
the unique feature that reviewers examine the financial statement disclosures specifically 
to identify deficiencies. This intentional search for deficiencies has the benefit that it is 
likely to reveal common disclosure deficiencies even if auditor style has a net positive 
effect on audit/disclosure quality.2 For all these reasons, I operationalize common 
disclosure deficiencies (a type of decision error on the part of the auditor) by looking at the 
similarity of comment letters between audit clients. 
This study is appealing in part because of the large body of theoretical and empirical 
literature on centralized decision-making supporting the link between auditor style and 
common disclosure deficiencies. Yet there remain credible reasons to expect no association 
between the presence of a common audit firm and the similarity of SEC comment letters. 
Even if the conceptual link between auditor style and common disclosure deficiencies is 
correct, operationalizing common disclosure deficiencies with similar SEC comment 
letters requires that comment letter reviewers are able to recognize the common disclosure 
deficiencies in a systematic, unbiased way. Concurrent work on SEC comment letters 
                                                 
2 It is important to note I make no claim to the net benefit of auditor style. I merely claim that auditor 
style has costs in the form of common disclosure deficiencies. 
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suggests that reviewers exhibit significant idiosyncratic effects (Baugh and Kim 2016). To 
the extent these idiosyncratic effects cause the results of the review to diverge from true 
common disclosure deficiencies related to auditor style, the idiosyncratic effects bias 
against finding results. The SEC comment letter review also encompasses the unaudited 
Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) section of the 10-K disclosures. Ex ante, 
it is not obvious that auditor style effects should apply to the MD&A, potentially biasing 
against finding results. And most importantly, the extant literature on auditor style suggests 
that style effects increase the comparability of financial statements among audit clients. 
This increased financial statement comparability (FSC) could increase audit efficiency and 
quality.3 As audit quality increases the potential for common disclosure deficiencies is 
constrained and all deficiencies become rarer and uncorrelated. Similarly, auditing firms 
centralize decisions about disclosure policy specifically to ensure that client disclosures 
comply with the relevant regulations, again constraining the potential for any kind of 
deficiency.4 These imply that strong auditor style effects may have no association, or even 
a negative association, with common disclosure deficiencies.    
                                                 
3 Direct tests of the relationship between FSC and audit quality are rare. However, a number of indirect 
tests using related constructs where FSC is likely to be higher provide evidence consistent with the notion 
that increased FSC increases audit quality. The best examples of such indirect tests in archival research come 
from the industry expertise literature. Numerous studies (Balsam, Krishnan, and Yang 2003; Bell, Causholli, 
and Knechel 2015; Gul, Fung, and Jaggi 2009; Kwon, Lim, and Tan 2007; Reichelt and Wang 2010) find 
that auditing clients within an auditor’s industry of expertise (where FSC is higher relative to clients outside 
one’s industry of expertise) increases audit quality. Admittedly, it is difficult to separate the effects of 
specialized auditor knowledge and FSC, particularly because FSC within an industry may lower the cost of 
building specialized knowledge. The closest thing to a direct test of FSC and its relationship with audit quality 
comes from Brown & Knechel (2016). They find that a text-based measure of disclosure compatibility (a 
potential proxy for FSC) is, under certain circumstances, associated with more accurate going concern 
opinions.  
4 Centralization is intended to ensure compliance with disclosure regulations by placing disclosure 
related decisions in the hands of in-house experts with the capability of interpreting complex and numerous 
disclosure standards. 
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Nevertheless, I hypothesize and provide evidence to suggest that auditor style is 
associated with common disclosure deficiencies. I test this hypothesis by identifying all 
client-year observations for publicly traded Big 4 clients between 2004 and 2013 that 
received an SEC comment letter related to their annual filing. I then pair each of these 
client-year observations with all other observations from the same industry and fiscal year.5 
Using a suite of three measures of comment letter similarity, I find that letter-pairs with the 
same audit firm have more similar comment letters. Clients with longer auditor tenure have 
the highest levels of comment letter similarity (i.e., client accrue their auditor’s style and 
deficiencies over time). I also find that clients that change auditors between comment 
letters assume the disclosure deficiencies of the subsequent auditor (i.e., their letters 
become more similar to those of other clients of the subsequent auditor). Further, I find 
that the results are unlikely to be driven by a number of alternative explanations including 
client selection and SEC reviewer influence. I finally find that the results do not necessarily 
imply differences in aggregate disclosure quality among the Big 4 auditing firms, merely 
that they have unique sets of deficiencies that are similarly severe. 
This study makes several contributions. The study contributes to the 
centralized/decentralized decision-making literature. While centralized/decentralized 
decision-making has been discussed in the financial accounting literature (Baiman, 
Larcker, and Rajan 1995; Baldenius and Reichelstein 2006; Robinson and Stocken 2013) 
it has not been discussed in the context of auditing, despite the high degree of centralization 
exhibited by most auditing firms. This study introduces the centralized versus decentralized 
                                                 
5 FPW match client-years within industry to control for industry level effects that might influence 
accruals and earnings. I follow their design but also note that the SEC Division of Corporate Finance assigns 
comment letter reviews to particular offices by industry. Thus, pairing within industry also controls for 
various aspects of the review process which generates comment letters. 
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debate to the auditing literature and provides evidence that auditing firms are subject to 
some of the same tradeoffs between centralization and decentralization as their publicly 
traded clients.  
The study also contributes to the auditor style literature. When discussing the 
drawbacks of a principles based accounting standards regime, Kothari, Ramanna, & 
Skinner (2010) argue that regulators need not worry about a lack of comparability inherent 
in principles based standards because audit firms will develop their own “working rules” 
which create comparability amenable to contracting and innovation. The auditor style 
literature to date has provided evidence consistent with this assertion (Francis, Pinnuck, 
and Watanabe 2013; Dhaliwal, Shenoy, and Williams 2016; Dhaliwal et al. 2016; Cai et 
al. 2016; Francis and Wang 2016). To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study to 
document that these auditor “working rules” have potentially negative consequences. That 
is, the auditor style that creates the comparability arises from centralized decision-making 
that propagates decision errors throughout an auditor’s clientele. These results expand the 
auditor style literature to the realm of financial statement disclosure regulation, and provide 
a more complete picture of auditor style that encompasses both benefits and costs.  
This study also sheds light on the poorly understood relationship between increased 
financial statement comparability and audit quality. In a related study, Brown & Knechel 
(2016), hereafter BK, find that a textual measure of disclosure compatibility (a potential 
proxy for comparability) between a client and the pool of other clients from the same 
auditor has mixed associations with their measures of audit quality; restatements, abnormal 
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accruals, and going concern opinion frequency and accuracy.6 I provide evidence that 
financial statement comparability (inferred from auditor style and the presence of a 
common auditor) is negatively associated with one dimension of audit quality, the presence 
of common disclosure deficiencies. 
The results of this study may be of interest to audit firms and regulators. Audit firms 
interested in improving audit/disclosure quality need be aware that their firm-wide policies 
and procedures that give rise to auditor style also expose them to potential systemic 
deficiencies when those policies and procedures have flaws. Knowledge of systemic 
disclosure issues across audit firms may help the SEC more efficiently direct attention and 
limited resources during the comment letter review process. And the PCAOB has expressed 
general concern over the quality of disclosure auditing (Staff Audit Practice Alert No. 12, 
2014) to which systemic disclosure deficiencies directly apply.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides background information 
and develops the major hypotheses. Section 3 describes the study’s research design. 
Section 4 presents the regression results. Section 5 discusses a number of additional 
analyses and alternative explanations and Section 6 provides concluding remarks. 
  
                                                 
6 The SEC comment letter setting differs from BK in that SEC employees review the quantitative 
portions of the financial statement disclosures in addition to the textual portions. Further, SEC comment letter 
reviews look explicitly for deficiencies, whereas the BK textual measure captures similarity in textual 
strengths as well as deficiencies. 
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2. Background and Hypothesis Development 
2.1 Prior Literature 
2.1.1 Common Auditors  
This study relates to three major literature streams. The first literature is that on auditor 
style, sometimes referred to as the common auditor literature. This literature began with 
FPW who documented that clients with the same auditor have more similar accruals 
structures and higher earnings covariation. These phenomena are attributed to the use of 
firm specific policies and procedures that standardize the accounting of clients within each 
firm. Subsequent work suggests that this enhanced comparability of financial reporting 
within a pool of audit clients facilitates merger transactions, relationship-specific 
investment, and lending (Cai et al. 2016; Dhaliwal et al. 2016; Dhaliwal, Shenoy, and 
Williams 2016; Francis and Wang 2016).  
There is also a growing number of studies that document significant “auditor style” 
effects exhibited by audit partners (Chen and Wang 2016; Y. Wang, Yu, and Zhao 2015; 
Aobdia, Lin, and Petacchi 2015; Goodwin and Wu 2014; Knechel, Vanstraelen, and Zerni 
2015; Gul, Wu, and Yang 2013). However, it is important to differentiate between auditor 
style at the firm level and auditor style at the partner level. At the partner level, auditor 
style is created by the idiosyncratic variation of each individual partner’s decisions. Such 
idiosyncratic variation is constrained by the use of policies and procedures which 
standardize decisions by moving authority away from the partner to the policy maker. 
Therefore, it is generally expected that partner level auditor style is less prevalent among 
Big 4 firms where internal policies and procedures are robust (Gul, Wu, and Yang 2013; 
Chen and Wang 2016). However, auditor style at the firm level is created by, not 
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constrained by, policies and procedures. Because policies and procedures are perceived to 
be more robust for Big 4 firms, auditor style at the firm level is generally expected to be 
more prevalent for Big 4 audit firms. It is auditor style at the firm level that is of interest in 
this study.   
2.1.2 SEC Comment Letters 
The second literature stream, related to the setting in which I test my hypotheses, is that 
on SEC comment letters. A large portion of this literature is dedicated to the determinants 
of comment letter receipt. Among many others characteristics, clients that are less 
profitable, more complex, have low accounting quality, or are in industries that require 
more subjective estimates are more likely to receive a comment letter (Cassell, Dreher, and 
Myers 2013; Boone, Linthicum, and Poe 2013; Hribar, Kravet, and Wilson 2013). Another 
major portion of the literature is dedicated to the consequences of comment letter receipt. 
Cassell et al. (2013) find that comment letter receipt is associated with financial 
restatements. Receipt of a SEC comment letter is also associated with decreases in 
institutional ownership (Gietzmann and Isidro 2013), increases in audit fees (Gietzmann 
and Pettinicchio 2013), increased insider trading (Dechow, Lawrence, and Ryans 2015) 
and subsequent improvement in disclosure quality (Bens, Cheng, and Neamtiu 2016; 
Hennes and Schenck 2014).  
2.1.3 Centralized Decision-Making 
The third related literature stream is that on centralized decision-making. The literature 
on centralized decision-making in economics and management is expansive and a 
comprehensive review is beyond the scope of this study. I instead highlight sub-streams of 
the literatures that are particularly relevant to the hypotheses at hand.  
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The economics literature investigates how centralized decision-making affects decision 
quality. Much of this literature, beginning with Hayek (1945), highlights that quality 
decisions require quality information. Within an organization, many individuals will likely 
not possess the information required to make a high quality decision, particularly if the 
information required is specialized and difficult to communicate. Centralization of 
decision-making is one mechanism through which this information problem may be 
resolved. Decision power is centralized with an individual that possesses the requisite 
information. This person then makes one decision for all individuals, ensuring the requisite 
information is incorporated (Alavi and Leidner 2001; Grant 1996; Hayek 1945). However, 
Hayek (1945) suggests that in some circumstances centralized decision-making may harm 
decision quality. Individuals other than the central decision maker may have superior 
information, often because the central decision maker is somewhat removed from the tasks 
and details underlying the decision. This information may be difficult to communicate to 
the central decision maker and so it is not incorporated into the final decision, potentially 
creating decision errors. 
Arcuri & Dari‐Mattiacci (2010) develop a model based on portfolio theory in which 
centralizing decision-making increases the scope and size of decision errors. The model 
illustrates why errors in a centralized environment are global and permeate throughout the 
entity. In their model, each individual decision is akin to an investment and the collective 
set of decisions is akin to an investment portfolio. Decentralization of decisions throughout 
an organization is similar to diversifying a portfolio across investment opportunities. While 
it is nearly certain some investments (decisions) will fail, the odds of a global, portfolio 
(organization) threatening failure are extremely low. However, with centralized decision-
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making the investments all go into the same opportunity. This portfolio assumes substantial 
risks related to non-diversification because if the chosen investment opportunity (decision) 
fails then the entire portfolio (organization) may fail with it.  
The organizational management literature investigates how centralized decision-
making influences the variance of firm performance. Sah & Stiglitz (1991) develop a model 
in which the strengths and weaknesses of CEOs are magnified in a centralized environment 
where the CEO has more authority over operations. This magnification leads to a higher 
variance in organization performance even while mean performance and CEO ability 
remain constant. Consistent with this, Adams, Almeida, & Ferreira (2005) find that 
powerful CEOs (i.e., ones with centralized decision-making authority) are associated with 
more variable stock returns. And Cheng (2008) find that clients with large boards of 
directors (i.e., low decision-making centralization) have less variable stock returns. The 
key insight from this literature, similar to Arcuri & Dari‐Mattiacci (2010),  is that 
centralization magnifies the consequences of errors.   
2.2 Audit Firm Decision Centralization  
A critical assumption in ascribing the relationship between auditor style and common 
disclosure deficiencies to centralized decision-making is that audit firms do in fact 
centralize decision making throughout the firm via their policies and procedures. The 
following is a list of common audit activities that represent centralized decision-making 
with a formal policy/procedure or with a central decision making group: 
 Consulting the national practice office before making certain significant decisions 
(e.g., asset impairment, issuing a going concern opinion, noting a material weakness). 
 Formal meetings and coordination between industry/subject matter expert groups 
throughout the practice. 
 Use of standardized sampling tools. 
 Use of standardized work papers. 
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 Use of standardized decision aids. 
 
Particularly relevant to the comment letter setting is the use of disclosure checklists. A 
disclosure checklist is a decision aid, typically computerized, used by the engagement 
auditor to review the client’s 10-K disclosures for completeness. The use of disclosure 
checklists is widespread (Dowling and Leech 2007). All of the Big 4 firms have their own 
internally generated disclosure checklists.7 The checklists serve as the prime example of 
how decision-making is centralized in Big 4 audit firms with respect to the client’s 10-K 
disclosures. The decision of whether or not the disclosures are complete is not left to the 
engagement auditor. It is decided by the creator(s) of the disclosure checklist, and those 
creators communicate their policy to the engagement auditor via the decision aid. 
2.3 SEC Comment Letter Review Process  
Section 408 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) mandates that the SEC: 
“…shall review disclosures made by issuers reporting under section 13(a) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (including reports filed on Form 10–K), and which have 
a class of securities listed on a national securities exchange or traded on an automated 
quotation facility of a national securities association, on a regular and systematic basis 
for the protection of investors.” 
 
The section also mandates that the review take place no less frequently than once every 
three years. Within this three-year period the exact date of the review is at the discretion of 
the SEC. However, SOX Section 408 outlines factors the SEC should consider when 
scheduling reviews. These factors include: 
 Whether an issuer filed a material misstatement. 
 Whether an issuer has experienced significant volatility in its stock price. 
 Whether an issuer has a large market capitalization. 
 Whether an issuer has a large price to earnings ratio (for emerging companies). 
 Whether an issuer’s operations are central to any material sector of the economy. 
                                                 
7 Promotional material for the EY disclosure checklist is available at:  
www.ey.com/GL/en/Issues/IFRS/IFRS-disclosure-checklists 
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 Any other factor the SEC deems relevant. 
The filing reviews are performed by personnel in the Division of Corporation Finance, 
a department within the SEC housed in Washington DC. Reviews are assigned to reviewers 
(who are mostly professional accountants and/or lawyers) based on the issuer’s industry.8 
When a reviewer finds a disclosure deficiency, the SEC sends a comment letter to the 
issuer outlining the disclosure issue(s). The letter generally asks the issuer to a) provide 
clarifying information to the SEC, b) provide clarifying disclosure in future financial 
statements, or c) in extreme cases, restate filed financial statements. The issuer is required 
to respond to the SEC within 10 days. The response may represent compliance with the 
SEC’s request. The issuer may also respond with reasons they disagree with the SEC’s 
requests. In the latter case, the SEC and issuer will discuss/negotiate the issues until the 
SEC is satisfied with the resolution. Subsequent communications may also occur because 
the issuer’s compliance with the original request highlights new issues that require further 
elaboration.  
Once the SEC is satisfied with the issuer’s response to the comment letter they close 
the review. All correspondences between the issuer and the SEC are made publicly 
available within 20 days of the review closure.9 
2.4 Hypothesis Development  
Company policies and procedures that give rise to auditor style are a form of centralized 
decision-making that takes the power to make decisions relevant to a business task away 
                                                 
8 Reviews typically involve more than one SEC reviewer. Often there is a staff level employee who 
develops a list of potential comments that are then approved by a senior level employee. In this study I refer 
to this group of personnel as the letter “reviewer”. 
9 Prior to 2012 letters were made public within 45 days of review closure. 
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from the frontline employee performing the task and places that power in the hands of the 
policy writer. The policy writer makes one decision for the entire company and 
communicates it through the company’s policies and procedures manual. Task performers 
are expected to follow the directives of the policy writer, and exceptions to the policy often 
require authorization from management. The transfer of decision-making power away from 
the frontline employee to the policy writer is in most instances intentional. It allows for the 
specialized knowledge of the policy writer, which would be difficult to comminute to task 
performers, to influence how tasks are performed (Hayek 1945; Grant 1996; Alavi and 
Leidner 2001). In this way, the task performance is standardized and improved throughout 
the entity.  
However, centralized decision-making is not a panacea. The standardization of 
decisions due to centralization can also lead to repetition of errors when the policy writer 
“gets it wrong”. The task performers repeat the error as they follow the policy, which leads 
to errors that are global in scope and that permeate throughout the entity (Arcuri and Dari‐
Mattiacci 2010). For a public accounting firm, a disclosure deficiency identified by the 
SEC is an indicator of a decision error with respect to the completeness and sufficiency of 
the 10-K disclosures.  
If centralized decision-making leads to global level errors, then auditor style may be 
associated with global disclosure deficiencies among the firm’s clients. In other words, 
there may be a set of disclosure deficiencies that are common among a large portion of an 
audit firm’s clientele. And the SEC comment letter review process is an ideal way of 
identifying such deficiencies. SEC comment letters are essentially a list of issues in the 
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financial statement disclosures that a regulator believes may be insufficient/not in 
compliance with disclosure standards.  
I note that the audited financial statement disclosures, like the financial statements 
themselves, are a joint work product of the auditor and client, and thus issues in an SEC 
comment letter may be an indictment of a client’s disclosure policies and not the audit 
firm’s policies per se. However, at a minimum the audit firm’s policy allowed the 
disclosure crafted by the client to be filed with the SEC. In this way, the auditor’s policies 
are at least partially responsible for any comment letter issues found in the audited 
disclosures. Further, the rise in popularity of audit firm disclosure checklists discussed in 
Section 2.3 suggests that auditors are in fact influencing client disclosure policies in a 
meaningful way. Thus, more similar comment letters between two clients are indicative of 
more similar disclosure deficiencies between the auditors that signed off on those financial 
statements. This reasoning leads me to my first hypothesis: 
H1: Auditor style is associated with common disclosure deficiencies amongst audit 
clients as measured by more similar SEC comment letters. 
 
Ascribing the association between auditor style and common disclosure deficiencies 
among clientele to centralized policies and procedures is dependent on the assumption that 
clients adopt the disclosure positions recommended by their auditor’s policies and 
procedures. This assumption appears reasonable given recent and concurrent studies that 
document that textual components of the financial statement disclosures are more similar 
for clients with the same auditor (Brown and Knechel 2016; McMullin 2016) and the 
widespread use of disclosure checklists which provide a plausible mechanism for auditor 
style to influence 10-K disclosures. However, it’s unlikely that all audit clients have 
adopted the disclosure policies of their auditor (i.e., their auditor’s style) equally. The 
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degree to which a client has adopted their auditor’s style may vary based on client-auditor 
tenure, the independence inherent in the auditor-client relationship, or the sophistication 
level of the client’s internal financial statement preparers. In the case of client-auditor 
tenure specifically, auditors are unlikely to fully impose every policy and procedure to the 
fullest in the first years of an engagement. However, with each passing audit the auditor 
has another opportunity to move the client’s reporting closer to the idealized standard 
represented by the policies and procedures. Consistent with this intuition, BK find that their 
measure of disclosure compatibility between a client and their auditor increases for up to 
five years after a client switches to the auditor. These results imply that auditors’ style over 
disclosures accumulates as a function of auditor tenure. If two clients with the same auditor 
both have long auditor tenure, then they may both have more fully adopted the same auditor 
style and thus have converged toward the same policies and procedures. If this were true 
one would expect such clients to have the greatest similarities in auditor style, and with 
that style the greatest similarities in disclosure deficiencies. This reasoning leads me to the 
first part of my second hypothesis.   
H2a: For those clients that have the same auditing firm, the commonality of disclosure 
deficiencies, as measured by more similar SEC comment letters, is higher among 
those clients that have long auditor tenure. 
 
If tenure causes clients with the same auditing firm to converge in style and 
deficiencies, then the opposite may be true as well. That is to say long auditor tenure for 
clients at different auditing firms may cause them to diverge in style and deficiencies. If 
the Big 4 auditing firms’ styles are meaningfully different, and clients that have long tenure 
have most fully adopted those styles, then clients with long tenure but different auditing 
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firms should have the lowest levels of style and disclosure similarity. This reasoning leads 
me to the second part of my second hypothesis. 
H2b: For those clients that have different auditing firms, the commonality of disclosure 
deficiencies, as measured by more similar SEC comment letters, is lowest among 
those clients that have long audit tenure. 
 
If auditors exhibit their own firm specific style, the question arises of what happens 
when a client changes auditors. Prior literature suggests that the client takes on the style of 
the new auditor. FPW find that abnormal accruals and earnings covariation become more 
similar to the clients of the subsequent auditor after changing. Similarly, BK find that after 
clients change audit firms their financial statement disclosures become more similar to the 
new auditor’s pool of existing audit clients. If clients assume the style of the subsequent 
auditor upon changing, and auditor style is associated with common disclosure 
deficiencies, then it may be that clients also assume the set of disclosure deficiencies 
created by that style. This new set of disclosure deficiencies should result is comment 
letters, that are essentially a listing of disclosure deficiencies, that more closely match the 
comment letters of other clients of the subsequent auditor. This reasoning leads me to my 
third hypothesis: 
H3: Audit clients assume the disclosure deficiencies of new auditors after auditor 
changes as measured by more similar SEC comment letters with the clients of the 
subsequent auditor. 
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3. Research Design 
3.1 Sample Construction 
I begin constructing the main sample of comment letters using the Audit Analytics 
Commlett file. The sample includes comment letters issued for client fiscal years 2004 to 
2013. I begin with fiscal year 2004 because comment letters issued prior to August 1, 2004 
were not made public. I end the sample with fiscal year 2013 to allow sufficient time for 
the conversation to conclude and be made public. Each comment letter may have many 
observations on the Commlett file, one for each correspondence between the SEC and the 
audit client under review until the SEC closes the review. I follow Cassel et al. (2013) and 
remove comment letter conversations that appear to have incomplete data. This includes 
removing all observations for conversations that a) are not initiated by the SEC, b) do not 
contain a “No Further Comment” letter, c) contain only one letter from the SEC, d) contain 
less than three letters in total and e) have different first/last letter dates than the Audit 
Analytics Commlettconv file. Further, I restrict the sample to only those conversations that 
reference a company annual filing in the first letter and reference one of the six major issue 
types provided by Audit Analytics.10 I follow FPW and remove comment letters for clients 
without a Big 4 auditor, clients with less than $10 million in total assets and letters 
referencing a fiscal year with a new auditor. After merging the Commlett file with the Audit 
Analytics Auditopin/Auditsox404 and Compustat Funda files, and screening for missing 
control variables, I have a final sample of 10,536 letters for 3,677 unique audit clients. The 
process used to create the comment letter sample is described in Table 1. 
                                                 
10 After screening the Commlett file I compress it to one observation per comment letter by keeping only 
the first correspondence. 
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[Insert Table 1 Here] 
Table 2 Panel A presents descriptive statistics for the comment letter sample. All 
variables are defined in Appendix A.   
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
In order to test the similarity of two comment letters it is necessary to pair comment 
letter observations and compare their attributes. I follow FPW and create a panel of pair-
wise observations by pairing up all unique combinations of comment letters within a fiscal 
year and industry (2 digit SIC code). For example, if a given fiscal year and industry 
contained three letter observations (1, 2 and 3) the resulting letter-pair observations would 
be Letter 1 + Letter 2, Letter 1 + Letter 3 and Letter 2 + Letter 3. The pairing process is 
described in detail in Appendix B. Table 2 Panel B presents descriptive statistics for the 
letter-pairs sample.  
 I follow previous studies that use a pairs design (De Franco, Kothari, and Verdi 2011; 
Francis et al. 2009; Francis, Pinnuck, and Watanabe 2013) and create difference and 
minimum versions of the client-year control variables included in the comment letter 
sample (control variables are discussed in detail in Section 3.3). The suffix Diff in a 
variable’s name denotes the difference variables which are the absolute value of the 
difference for that variable between the two comment letters in the letter-pair. The suffix 
Min denotes the minimum variables which are the minimum value of that variable between 
the two comment letters in the letter-pair. 
3.2 Measures of Comment Letter Similarity 
I construct three measures of comment letter similarity.  
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The first two measures rely on the comment letter coding provided by Audit Analytics 
to identify issue keys (detailed codes for particular accounts and problems) or issue types 
(high level groups of similar issue keys) that appear in both letters of a pair. I follow Cassell 
et al. (2013) and use the six major issue types, and individual issue keys contained therein, 
provided by Audit Analytics to construct these two measures. The first measure, Similar 
Keys, is the number of issue keys (out of 215) that appear in both letters of a letter-pair, 
scaled by the total number of issue keys noted in both letters. The second measure, Similar 
Types, is the number of issue types (out of six) where both letters in a letter-pair have at 
least one issue key noted for that type, scaled by the total number of types in each letter 
that have at least one issue key noted.11 These measures range between zero and one. A 
higher value of Similar Keys/Types indicates more similar comment letters.  
The third measure of comment letter similarity, Similar Text, measures the similarity 
of the textual content of the two comment letters in a pair using the Salton, Wong, & Yang 
(1975) Vector Space Model (VSM).12 Prior literature in accounting has used this model to 
examine the similarity of 10-K disclosures (Brown and Tucker 2011; Brown and Knechel 
2016; Peterson, Schmardebeck, and Wilks 2015). The VSM identifies unique words in a 
text string and coverts them into a vector of integers. Each element in the vector captures 
whether a particular word appears in the text string. For any two text strings, the angle 
between their VSM vectors represents the similarity of the text. The cosine of the angle is 
                                                 
11 Cassel et al. (2013) identify six major issue types provided by Audit Analytics. They are Accounting 
Rule and Disclosure Issues, Internal Control Disclosure Issues, Management Discussion and Analysis 
Issues, Regulatory Filing Issues, Risk Factor Issues, and Other Issues. However, 80% of letters have an 
issue identified for the Accounting Rule and Disclosure type. So I follow Cassel et al. (2013) and break this 
type down into four types, Core Issues, Non-Core Issues, Classification Issues and Fair Value Issues, to 
achieve more meaningful variation. This results in a total of nine major issues types for the Similar Types 
variable. 
12 The full text of each comment letter is available on the Audit Analytics Commlett file. 
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then taken to create a value that ranges between zero and one. A value of zero represents 
text strings that have no words in common. A value of one represents identical text strings. 
When calculating Similar Text, I follow Peterson et al. (2015) and use word stemming and 
remove stop words and proper nouns.13 The exclusion of proper nouns is particularly 
important because occasional references to a client’s auditor might otherwise create 
mechanical similarity between letter pairs with the same auditor. Like Similar Keys and 
Similar Types, a higher value for Similar Text indicates more similar comment letters. For 
ease of interpretation, all three measures of comment letter similarity are multiplied by 100. 
3.3 Control Variable Specification 
The control variables used in the regression analyses are based off those factors found 
in Cassell et al. (2013) to be related to comment letter characteristics.14 Detailed definitions 
of all variables are provided in Appendix A.  
Several factors are expected to be related to comment letter characteristics because 
Section 408 of SOX explicitly tells the SEC to consider them when scheduling/performing 
comment letter reviews (see the discussion of these considerations in Section 2.2). These 
factors include whether the client has filed a material restatement (ICMW and Concurrent 
Restatement), whether the client has experienced significant volatility in its stock price 
(High Volatility), and whether the client has a large market capitalization (LnMV).  
A number of factors documented in prior research to be associated with financial 
reporting quality are also included. This is done because lower financial reporting quality 
is expected to be associated with lower disclosure quality, which in turn should generate 
                                                 
13 Word stemming removes suffixes to obtain root words. Stop words include, for example, “the”, it”, 
this” or “that”. Proper nouns include, for example, states, cities or names. 
14 The one major exception is a suite of corporate governance variables. These variables are largely 
insignificant in Cassell et al. (2013) and are omitted for parsimony. 
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more severe SEC comment letters. These financial reporting quality factors are firm age 
(Firm Age) and client profitability (Loss and ROA). 
A client’s bankruptcy risk (Altman Z) is included because financially distressed clients 
are less compliant with 8-K reporting requirements which may spillover into less 
compliance with 10-K reporting requirements (Schwartz and Soo 1995; Schwartz and Soo 
1996).  
Factors associated with financial reporting complexity are included because more 
complex filings have greater opportunity for misapplication of 10-K reporting 
requirements. These factors include the number of reporting segments (Segments), whether 
the client has experienced significant growth (Sales Growth), whether the client acquired 
another company (MNA), whether the client underwent restructuring activities 
(Restructure), whether the client obtained external financing (Ext Financing), and whether 
the client is in a high litigation risk industry (Litigation Risk). 
The number of filings referenced in each comment letter (Filings) is included to control 
for the mechanical relationship between a broader comment letter review and its outcomes 
(e.g., more fillings reviewed may mechanically lead to identifying more issues). 
  Finally, the length of the relationship between the client and their auditor (Auditor 
Tenure) is included because auditor tenure influences audit and financial reporting quality 
(Geiger and Raghunandan 2002; Johnson, Khuran, and Reynolds 2002; Myers, Myers, and 
Omer 2003). Lower audit/financial reporting quality may lower disclosure quality, which 
should generate more severe comment letters. I do not include factors for auditor size 
because the sample is restricted to clients of Big 4 auditors. Thus, the sample selection 
controls for factors related to differing sizes of audit firms.  
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3.4 Univariate Results 
Table 2 Panel C presents descriptive statistics for the letter-pairs sample after splitting 
the sample on the value of Same Auditor. The panel also presents tests of the difference in 
means for each variable across the subsamples. The three measures of comment letter 
similarity are all higher for the Same Auditor = 1 subsample and the differences are all 
statistically significant at the p < 0.01 level. This provides the first univariate evidence 
consistent with H1.  
Table 3 Panel A presents Pearson correlations for the comment letter sample. Table 3 
Panel B presents Pearson correlations between Same Auditor and the three measures of 
comment letter similarity using the letter-pairs sample. The correlations in Table 3 Panel 
B present additional univariate tests of H1.   
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
All three comment letter similarity measures are positively associated with Same 
Auditor at the p < 0.01 level (p values un-tabulated). In total, the descriptive statistics 
provide evidence consistent with auditor style being associated with common disclosure 
deficiencies in the form of more similar comment letters.  
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4. Regression Results 
4.1 Auditor Style and SEC Comment Letter Similarity 
To formally test H1 I estimate the following equation for the letter-pairs sample: 
Comment Letter Similarityi1,i2,t = β0 + β1 * Same Auditori1,i2,t + βk * Controlsi1,i2,t + υ + ε    
(1) 
where the subscripts i1, i2, and t denote client 1, client 2 and time t, respectively. Comment 
Letter Similarity is one of three measures of comment letter similarity discussed in Section 
3.2. Same Auditor is an indicator variable that equals one if both clients in the comment-
letter-pair have the same audit firm, and zero otherwise. Controls is a suite of control 
variables documented in prior literature (e.g., Cassell et al. 2013) to be associated with 
comment letter outcomes and discussed in detail in Section 3.3. υ is a vector of indicator 
variables to control for year and industry (2 digit SIC code) fixed effects. The model is 
estimated using OLS regressions with robust standard errors clustered by the gvkey 
combination of the two clients in the letter-pair (160,696 clusters). A positive coefficient 
on β1 is consistent with auditor style being associated with common disclosure deficiencies 
in the form of more similar comment letters.  
Table 4 presents the tests of H1 using equation (1), the letter-pairs sample and the three 
measures of comment letter similarity.  
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
The sample size in column (3) is slightly smaller because of missing comment letter 
text in Audit Analytics. With respect to H1, Same Auditor is positive and significant at the 
p < 0.10 level or better in all three columns. These results are consistent with H1 and 
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suggest that the presence of a common auditor (auditor style) is associated with more 
similar comment letters (common disclosure deficiencies).  
With regard to the economic interpretations of the estimated effects, the 0.157 
coefficient estimate on Same Auditor in column (1) represents a 0.157 percentage point 
increase in the percentage of issue keys that show up in both letters. The coefficient on 
Same Auditor in column (2) can similarly be interpreted as a 0.047 percentage point 
increase in the percentage of issue types that appear in both letters. Relative to the mean 
value of Similar Keys (Similar Types) in Table 2 Panel B the coefficient on Same Auditor 
implies a 1.4% (0.5%) increase the average similarity of issue keys (types). While Similar 
Text has no such intuitive interpretation, the point estimate of 0.169 in column (3) equates 
to a 0.3% increase in textual similarity relative to Similar Text’s mean in Table 2 Panel B. 
These values, admittedly, appear small. However, there are two major reasons that even 
these somewhat small effects should be of concern. One, given the size of the capital 
markets and the importance of financial statement disclosures to their function, even 
marginal improvements in disclosure quality may have large dollar value consequences for 
issuers and investors. Two, any systemic decision errors on part of the auditing firms 
should be of concern given the industry’s history of catastrophic audit failures (e.g., Enron, 
Worldcom, Waste Management, etc.). To the extent these systemic disclosure deficiencies 
(and potentially other decision errors due to centralized decision-making) increase the 
chances of another of these catastrophic failures at all they represent something that should 
at least be acknowledged by the industry and academics alike.   
4.2 Auditor Style and the Effects of Tenure  
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To test H2a and H2b I estimate a variation of equation (1) with two subsamples derived 
from the main letter-pairs sample. In the analyses so far (and in subsequent analyses) I 
explicitly control for auditor tenure. But to test H2a and H2b with respect to how auditor 
tenure influences style and disclosure deficiencies, I replace Auditor Tenure Diff and 
Auditor Tenure Min with Long Tenure. Long Tenure equals one if both clients in the letter-
pair have been with their auditor for five or more years. I choose five years because BK 
suggests that financial statement disclosure compatibility between a client and their auditor 
increases during the first five years of an engagement. I then estimate the following 
equation (2).  
Comment Letter Similarityi1,i2,t = β0 + β1 * Long Tenurei1,i2,t + βk * Controlsi1,i2,t + υ + ε 
(2) 
where Long Tenure is as defined above and all other variables are as defined in equation 
(1). I estimate equation (2) for two subsamples derived from the main comment letter-pair 
sample. The first subsample is only those letter-pairs that have the same auditing firm (i.e., 
Same Auditor = 1). In this subsample, a positive coefficient on β1 indicates that, consistent 
with H2a, within the pool of clients that have the same auditor, those clients that have had 
their auditor for a longer time have the highest levels of comment letter similarity. This is 
consistent with the idea that as auditor tenure increases these clients converge in disclosure 
style due to their auditor, and with the style converge in disclosure deficiencies. I use the 
second subsample of letter-pairs that do not have the same auditing firm (i.e., Same Auditor 
= 0) to test H2b. In this second subsample a negative coefficient on β1 indicates that, 
consistent with H2b, within the pool of clients that have different auditors, those clients 
that have had their auditor for a longer time have the lowest levels of comment letter 
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similarity. This is consistent with the idea that these clients are converging towards 
meaningfully different disclosure styles, and are thus diverging from one another in both 
disclosure style and deficiencies inherent in that style. 
[Insert Table 5 Here] 
Table 5 presents the estimations of equation (2) using the two subsamples of letter-
pairs and the three measures of comment letter similarity. Consistent with H2a, Long 
Tenure is positive and statistically significant at the p < 0.10 level or better in columns (2) 
and (3). These results suggest that within the group of clients that have the same auditor, 
those that have both had their auditor for five or more years have the highest level of 
comment letter similarity. Consistent with H2b, Long Tenure is negative and significant at 
the p < 0.10 level or better in columns (4) and (6). These results suggest that within the 
group of clients that have different audit firms, those clients that have long auditor tenure 
have the lowest levels of comment letter similarity. Taken together, columns (1) through 
(6) suggest that as auditor tenure increases clients converge (diverge) in style and 
deficiencies with clients from the same (different) audit firm.   
4.3 Auditor Changes and Assuming Disclosure Deficiencies 
To test H3 with respect to auditor changes I modify the main letter-pairs sample in a 
number of important ways. First, I limit the clients included in the comment letter sample 
to Switchers and Non-Switchers. Switchers are clients that have exactly two auditors 
associated with all their comment letters (i.e., they changed auditors between comment 
letters, but only once). Non-Switchers are clients that have exactly one auditor associated 
with all their comment letters. Switchers serve as a treatment group for the tests of H3 since 
they changed auditors and the properties of their comment letters can be observed both pre 
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and post auditor change. The Non-Switchers serve as a control group because they never 
changed auditors and are thus exempt from the treatment of interest. I then pair Switcher 
comment letters to Non-Switcher letters from the same industry and year. However, 
Switcher letters are only paired to Non-Switcher letters that have the Switcher’s subsequent 
auditor. This creates a panel of letter-pair observations where each observation includes 
one Switcher letter and one Non-Switcher, and the Non-Switcher letters always have the 
Switcher’s subsequent auditor. This panel allows me to construct the variable Switch which 
equals one if the two clients in the modified letter-pair have the same auditor at time t (i.e., 
the letters were written after the Switcher changed auditors), and zero otherwise. This 
process is described in detail in Appendix C. The Switch variable captures the degree to 
which the Switchers’ comment letters become more similar to the letters of Non-Switchers 
at the Switcher’s subsequent auditor. Using the Switch variable and the modified letter-pair 
sample I estimate the following equation: 
Comment Letter Similarityi1,i2,t = β0 + β1 * Switchi1,i2,t + βk * Controlsi1,i2,t + υ + ε         (3) 
where Switch is as defined above and all other variables are as defined in equation (1). A 
positive coefficient on β1 indicates that, consistent with H3, clients assume the disclosure 
deficiencies of the subsequent auditor (as measured by increased similarity to the comment 
letters received by other clients of the subsequent auditor) after they switch to the 
subsequent auditor. 
Table 6 presents the tests of H3 using equation (3), the modified letter-pair sample and 
the three measures of comment letter similarity.  
[Insert Table 6 Here] 
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Consistent with H3, Switch is positive and statistically significant at the p < 0.05 level 
or better in all three columns. These results suggest that audit clients assume the reporting 
deficiencies of their subsequent auditor, due to the subsequent auditor’s style, after 
changing. 
Tables 4, 5 and 6 all provide evidence consistent with hypotheses 1, 2 and 3, 
respectively. This body of evidence suggests that a) auditor style is associated with 
common disclosure deficiencies, b) clients converge towards one another as auditor tenure 
increases and they more fully adopt their auditor’s style/deficiencies and c) audit clients 
assume the style and deficiencies of new auditors. 
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5. Additional Analyses and Alternative Explanations 
5.1 Auditor Style and SEC Comment Letter Similarity by Type 
Audit Analytics classifies issue keys into six broad types. The Accounting Rule type 
contains issues related to GAAP footnote disclosures which are explicitly audited by the 
auditor under AU 551. The MD&A type contains issues related to the management 
discussion and analysis which is reviewed by the auditor under AU 550. It is possible, 
given the auditors varying degree of involvement in each of these types that the auditor 
style effect varies. It may be that the auditor’s heavier hand in the GAAP related disclosures 
due to the auditing standards creates stronger style effects and thus more commonality in 
deficiencies. Or it may be that the detailed and voluminous disclosure regulations 
applicable to the Accounting Rule type, relative to the less regulated MD&A, constrain 
meaningful differences in the policies and procedures of the Big 4 eliminating any unique 
style or disclosure deficiencies. To explore these possibilities I re-estimate equation (1) 
using variations of Similar Keys that count only the issue keys from a particular type. For 
example, for the Accounting Rule issue type the dependent variable equals the count of all 
issues keys from the Accounting Rule type that were present in both letters in the letter-
pair, scaled by the number of keys available in the Accounting Rule type. A positive 
coefficient on Same Auditor is consistent with auditor style being associated with common 
disclosure deficiencies for that issue type. Because the main analyses are conditional on 
the receipt of a comment letter (limiting the sample those letters that have at least one issue 
for any of the six types), I similarly limit the sample to those letters that have at least one 
key for a given type. That is to say that for the Accounting Rule measure of Similar Keys, 
all the letters have at least one Accounting Rule key noted. 
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[Insert Table 7 Here] 
Table 7 presents the results of these estimations. For brevity, the control variables have 
been omitted. Coefficients on Same Auditor have been standardized to facilitate 
comparisons across models. Same Auditor is positive and significant at the p < 0.05 level 
or better for both the Accounting Rule and MD&A issue types. As far are their relative 
magnitudes, the two coefficients appear to be of similar size. The coefficient in column (2) 
for the MD&A type (0.007) is slightly larger than that in column (1) for the Accounting 
Rule type (0.006), but in total it the MD&A and GAAP related disclosures have similar 
systemic disclosure issues by audit firm.   
For completeness, I also perform the same analyses for the other four issue types, 
Internal Control, Risk Factor, Regulatory Filing and Other. These results are reported in 
Table 7 columns (3) through (6). The coefficient on Same Auditor is only significant for 
the Other issue type. It’s standardized magnitude is slightly smaller than that for 
Accounting Rule and MD&A. It appears as if auditor style is not associated with common 
disclosure deficiencies for the Internal Control, Risk Factor and Regulatory Filing types. 
However, I note at least aspect of these additional issue types that may limit potential 
inferences. These issue types contain a large portion of nonrecurring disclosures items. 
Further, a lot of the nonrecurring items occur for reasons completely outside the auditor’s 
control. For example, most of the Regulatory Filing type keys deal with registration 
statement issues and so are only applicable to those clients with equity issuances. Similarly, 
most of the Internal Control keys are only applicable if a client has an un-remediated 
internal control material weakness at year end. These nonrecurring disclosure issues induce 
noise in the sense that clients for auditor X may have been hit with a particular issue more 
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often but weren’t only because the issue was not applicable to them that year. It also 
reduces the sample size of the tests because these categories are much less frequently cited, 
whereas most letters have an Accounting Rule and MD&A issue.   
5.2 Comment Letter Selection 
Comment letter recipients are not chosen randomly. SEC reviewers have discretion 
(within a three-year period) of when they review a client. Then within that pool of reviews 
certain clients are more likely to actually receive a letter than others (Cassell, Dreher, and 
Myers 2013). This potentially influences the documented results. Perhaps the documented 
results would not be present in the disclosure deficiencies of clients that did not receive a 
comment letter, if it were possible to observe them. Thus, the results of the study are 
generalizable only to the pool of clients with deficiencies noted by an SEC comment letter. 
However, I consider this limitation to be relatively minor for two reasons. One, a large 
proportion of Big 4 audit clients are included in the comment letter sample. For example, 
using the sample restrictions from this study, the Compustat/Audit Analytics universe for 
2004 to 2013 has 4,825 unique clients. The comment letter sample in this study has 3,677 
unique clients. Thus, generalizing to only the sample of clients that receive a comment 
letter still encompasses a majority of Big 4 clients. Two, the focus of the study is on the 
commonality of disclosure deficiencies given that a deficiency exists. The hypotheses make 
no mention of the frequency of deficiencies. In fact, I note in the hypothesis development 
that centralized decision-making often leads to better decisions implying fewer disclosure 
deficiencies overall. But when deficiencies exist, in a centralized environment, they are 
likely to permeate the entire entity. And the SEC comment letter setting is particularly 
adept at identifying clients where a deficiency exists. The SEC is required by law to review 
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every public issuer at least once every three years with the explicit charge of finding 
disclosure deficiencies. As such, the process that selects firms into the comment letter 
sample actually identifies, with a reasonable level of accuracy, the exact firms of interest 
in this study.  
5.3 Auditor Selection 
The selection of audit firms by clients is not random. If a client’s choice of audit firm 
is correlated with disclosure deficiencies (or in the extreme, clients knowingly choose 
auditors whose other clients have similar disclosure deficiencies) then this auditor 
selection, and not auditor style, may be driving my results. 
The auditor changes analyses reported in Table 6 offer evidence that the main results 
are not driven by self-selection. If this were the case, there would be no reason to expect 
the Switch variable to ever load in Table 6. If clients merely chose auditors with a similar 
pool of deficiencies then the client should be equally close to the subsequent auditor’s 
deficiencies before and after the change. Table 6 suggests that the client’s noted 
deficiencies become more similar to the deficiencies of other clients of the subsequent 
auditor after the change, which can’t be explained purely by endogenous matching. FPW 
find similar results in change style analyses that suggest the underlying construct of auditor 
style (which they also measure as the presence of a common auditor) is not wholly 
explained by client-auditor matching. 
Further, as noted in FPW, the most salient selection decision documented in the 
empirical and theoretical audit literature is the decision between a Big 4 auditor and non-
Big 4 auditor. Little evidence exists to suggest firms meaningfully select among the Big 4 
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auditors.15 I hold the choice of Big 4 versus non-Big 4 auditor constant in this study by 
restricting the analyses to only clients of Big 4 firms.  
However, one piece of recent evidence that does suggest that clients may meaningfully 
select among Big 4 audit firms is BK. BK find that Big 4 clients are more likely to switch 
to another Big 4 firm if their financial statement disclosures are less compatible with the 
disclosures of the other clients of their auditor. Further, the switching client is likely to 
switch to the Big 4 auditor whose existing clients have the most compatible financial 
statement disclosures. This appears to be evidence in favor of the matching explanation. 
However, BK also find that disclosure compatibility between a client and the audit firms’ 
other clients increases with auditor tenure. Again, it is difficult to explain this post auditor-
change effect as a product of client-auditor matching. If auditor style had no impact on 
financial statement disclosures, then there would be no reason to suspect that a new client 
should continue to get even more compatible after changing auditors. The only matching 
based explanation for this phenomenon would require the pool of other audit clients to keep 
turning over and becoming more compatible to the recently added client. This explanation 
would require a level of client turnover that is not observed in the data. Thus, even BK, 
which appears to be evidence in support of the client-auditor matching explanation, 
provides some evidence that auditor style effects are not purely a product of client-auditor 
matching.  
                                                 
15 The one exception to this is the choice between an industry expert auditor and a non-expert. Industry 
expert is not a documented determinant of SEC comment letter outcomes. However, to address the potential 
that industry expert selection is driving my results I both a) re-estimate the analyses dropping pairs where 
either auditor is an industry expert and b) re-estimate the analyses explicitly controlling for industry expertise. 
I define industry expertise as having 30% or more of client assets (I also use revenues) for an industry-year. 
In all cases I find my results are inferentially similar.    
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Similar to BK, I also find in Table 5 that the auditor style effect in this study is a partial 
function of auditor tenure. Again, if clients merely match to a similar auditor, and auditors 
do not exhibit any style on the client, then auditor tenure should not influence the 
relationship between having a common auditor and the similarity of comment letters.  
In summary, without experimental manipulation the possibility that client-auditor 
matching is influencing results can never be fully eliminated, and remains a potential 
limitation of the study. However, given the results of the switching analyses, the tenure 
analyses, the relative dearth of evidence suggesting clients meaningfully choose among 
Big 4 firms and the corroborating evidence from FPW and BK, client-auditor selection is 
likely not a significant issue in this study. 
5.4 SEC Reviewer Influence 
An SEC comment letter is a function of the financial statement disclosures under 
review and the SEC reviewer writing the letter. Auditor style only influences the former. 
Concurrent work suggests that individual reviewers exhibit significant idiosyncratic style 
effects on the outcomes of comment letter reviews (Baugh and Kim 2016). It may be 
necessary to control for the potential influence of individual SEC reviewers that may be 
affecting the results. To do this I create the variable Reviewer Diff which equals one if the 
letters in a letter-pair have a different reviewer. I obtain the reviewer identity from the 
signature line of the comment letter. In instances where multiple reviewers are noted in the 
signature line I use the first reviewer listed. In un-tabulated results, I add Reviewer Diff to 
the control variables for equations (1), (2a), (2b) and (3) and re-perform the analyses in 
Tables 4 through 6.16 The Reviewer Diff variable loads in the predicted direction (i.e., 
                                                 
16 I do not construct a Reviewer Min variable because there is no “minimum” value for two reviewers. 
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having different reviewers is associated with less similar comment letters) at the p < 0.01 
level in all twelve regressions. When using Similar Types as the measure of comment letter 
similarity the statistical significance for Same Auditor largely disappears after adding 
Reviewer Diff. However, the additional control has almost no effect on Same Auditor when 
using Similar Keys and Similar Text as the measures of similarity. This provides evidence 
that differences between individual reviewers are not driving the results.  
Although controlling for the effects of individual reviewers does not meaningfully 
change the documented results, there is still the potential that reviewers collectively may 
influence comment letter review outcomes. For example, reviewers may intentionally look 
for certain issues among the clients of one audit firm and not others. This asymmetric 
review may create a self-fulfilling prophecy in which it looks as though a deficiency is 
more prevalent among audit firm A because the reviewers never checked for that deficiency 
at audit firms B, C and D. Such a phenomenon is difficult to rule out empirically because 
it has the same observable predictions as H1 and H3. However, searching for particular 
deficiencies among the clients of a specific auditor would require conspicuous coordination 
throughout the Division of Corporation Finance responsible for comment letter reviews. 
And while the SEC discloses few details about the review process, anecdotally, my 
experience with the SEC suggests that such targeting of deficiencies by auditor does not 
occur. Further, the self-fulfilling prophecy does not explain the auditor tenure results in 
Table 5. These results suggest that within an audit firm’s clientele clients with long tenure 
have more fully adopted their auditor’s style and with it their auditor’s disclosure 
deficiencies. It may be plausible that the SEC would target particular issues by the client’s 
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auditor, it is not obvious though why the SEC would do this more for clients that had long 
auditor tenure.17   
There is a more limited version of the self-fulfilling prophecy that is empirically 
testable. If SEC reviewers begin targeting other clients of the same auditor after they have 
discovered an issue then there may be a temporal link between the probability a client has 
an issue noted and whether said issue had been previously noted. To test this temporal 
version of the self-fulfilling prophecy I use logistic regression to estimate the following 
equation: 
Issue Indi,t = β0 + β1 * Prior Issue Auditori,t  βk * Controlsi,t + υ + ε                  (4) 
where subscripts i and t denote client and time, respectively. Issue Ind is an indicator 
variable that equals one if a comment letter has at least one issue key noted for a particular 
issue type provided by Audit Analytics, and zero otherwise. Prior Issue Auditor is an 
indicator variable that equals one if, in the prior 365 days, another comment letter for a 
client with the same industry and same audit firm had an issue noted for the given type, 
and zero otherwise. Controls are the client-year versions of the control variables in equation 
(1) and υ is a vector of indicator variables to control for year and industry (2 digit SIC 
code) fixed effects. I estimate the model using the comment letter sample from Table 2 
Panel A.18 A positive coefficient on β1 in equation (4) is consistent with SEC comment 
                                                 
17 SEC comment letter reviews do have “seasons” in which particular issues are given higher focus. 
However, this is not the same as the self-fulling prophecy. So long as the search for the targeted issue is 
applied equally across audit firms then the season cycle would not create the documented results. For a given 
issue under review, a client would still actually have to have the targeted deficiency in order for it to be noted, 
and if a client did not have the deficiency noted it could be assumed the client did not actually have the 
deficiency. This still allows for the identification of common disclosure deficiencies. What the season cycle 
may do is shrink the set of common deficiencies likely to be discovered, potentially biasing against finding 
results. 
18 Fiscal year 2004 is removed from this panel so that all observations have time for a prior comment 
letter. 
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letter reviewers being more likely to identify an issue type after a client with the same 
industry and audit firm had an issue of the same type.  
[Insert Table 8 Here] 
Table 8 presents the results of estimating equation (4) for each of the six issue types 
provided by Audit Analytics. For brevity, the control variables have been omitted. Prior 
Issue Auditor is not statistically positive for any of the issue types. Further, Prior Issue 
Auditor is statistically negative at the p < 0.10 level for the Other issue type. These results 
provide no evidence in favor of the temporal self-fulfilling prophecy. In fact, the results in 
column (6) suggest that clients are less likely to receive a letter for a particular issue type 
after someone in their industry and with their audit firm received a letter with that issue 
type. This result is consistent with concurrent work that suggests clients modify their 10-
K disclosures in response to comment letters issued to peer clients (Brown, Tian, and 
Tucker 2015). I note that this phenomena would have the exact opposite effect of the 
temporal self-fulfilling prophecy, substantially biasing against finding similar comment 
letters among clients with the same auditor. 
5.5 Auditor Style for Non-Big 4 Clients 
FPW predict that the influence of the policies and procedures that give rise to auditor 
style will be stronger among Big 4 clients than non-Big 4 clients. This is because Big 4 
firms have greater capacity to create, and need for, centralized policies that apply US 
GAAP uniformly across clients.19 Consistent with this notion, FPW find only mixed and 
weak evidence of auditor style effects among non-Big 4 clients using abnormal accruals 
                                                 
19 The Big 4 firms’ increased capacity comes from their ability to absorb the fixed costs of developing 
policies and procedures and their access to experts capable of developing such policies and procedures. Their 
increased incentive comes from their distributed geographical structure and heightened litigation risk which 
increase the need for quality control measures such as detailed policies and procedures manuals. 
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similarity and earnings covariation. If policies and procedures have a greater influence on 
how Big 4 firms perform audits, then it follows that the similarity of Big 4 client comment 
letters should be greater than that of non-Big 4 clients. This is a difficult intuition to test in 
the comment letter setting because relatively few non-Big 4 clients receive comment 
letters. Further, approximately 30% of the smallest non-Big 4 audit firms that exist in the 
intersection of Audit Analytics and Compustat never have a client that receives a comment 
letter. Thus, the non-Big 4 clients and firms in the comment letter setting are larger with 
more incentives to standardize than those in a broader setting such as FPW. Nevertheless, 
I test this intuition by estimating equation (1) for a panel of letter-pair observations 
constructed from non-Big4 clients that received SEC comment letters.  
[Insert Table 9 Here] 
Table 9 presents the tests of the intuition that the auditor style effect, and thus the 
commonality of disclosure deficiencies, should be weaker for non-Big 4 letter-pairs using 
equation (1), the non-Big 4 letter-pairs sample and the three measures of comment letter 
similarity. For brevity, the control variables have been omitted. Similar to FPW, I find only 
weak and mixed evidence of auditor style effect/common disclosure deficiencies among 
non-Big 4 clients. The coefficient on Same Auditor is positive and significant at the p < 
0.05 level in column (3). However, it is insignificant in column (2) and it is negative and 
significant at the p < 0.10 level in column (1). These results do not provide consistent 
evidence for, and provide some evidence against, the existence of an auditor style effect 
among non-Big 4 auditing firms. This generally supports the notion that auditor style 
effects, and the common disclosure deficiencies they engender, are stronger among the Big 
4 auditing firms.   
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5.6 Using the Most Recent Filing Referenced 
A small percentage of letters reference more than one annual filling. When merging 
comment letters to Compustat and the Audit Analytics Auditopin file I use the 
Compustat/Audit Analytics fiscal year that matches the fiscal year of the oldest annual 
filing referenced in the comment letter. I test the robustness of this design choice by 
merging comment letters to Compustat/Audit Analytics using the fiscal year of the most 
recent annual filing referenced in the comment letter. In un-tabulated results I find the 
documented results are inferentially similar. 
5.7 Auditor Style and Overall Disclosure Quality 
The empirical results thus far suggest that the Big 4 auditing firms have unique 
disclosure styles that pass systemic disclosure deficiencies to their clients. This is not the 
same as suggesting that the clientele of the Big 4 auditing firms have, in aggregate, 
differing disclosure quality. It is possible that each of the auditing firms has unique sets of 
deficiencies that are, in aggregate, of similar severity. One potential way to measure overall 
disclosure quality is the likelihood of receiving an SEC comment letter. To test whether 
the Big 4 auditing firms have different aggregate levels of disclosure quality, as measured 
by the likelihood of receiving an SEC comment letter, I estimate the following logistic 
equations using the full sample of Compustat Big 4 client-year observations:20 
Letteri,t = β0 + βk * Controlsi,t + υ + ε                                          (5a) 
Letteri,t = β0 + βk * Controlsi,t + υ + Auditor Fixed Effects + ε                     (5b) 
                                                 
20 To construct this panel I use the sample selection process as described in Table 1 except that client-
years are not required to have an SEC comment letter. Therefore, any screens related to comment letter 
characteristics are ignored. 
41 
where Letter equals one if the client receives an SEC comment letter referencing year t, 
and zero otherwise. Controls are the client-year versions of control variables used in 
equation (1), minus those control variables directly related to comment letter 
characteristics. υ is a vector of indicator variables to control for year and industry (2 digit 
SIC code) fixed effects. Auditor Fixed Effects is a set of indicator variables that capture 
which of the Big 4 auditing firms the client engaged in year t. Auditor Fixed Effects capture 
whether clients of each Big 4 auditing firm, on the whole, have meaningfully different 
likelihoods of receiving an SEC comment letter. I perform a chi2-test for the joint 
significance of the auditor indicator variables to test whether the probability of receiving 
an SEC comment letter is statistically different among the Big 4 firms.  
[Insert Table 10 Here] 
Estimations of equations (5a) and (5b) are reported in Table 10 columns (1) and (2), 
respectively. Not only are the pseudo R2s in columns (1) and (2) the same to three decimal 
places (suggesting the auditor fixed effect does not meaningful improve model 
performance) but the chi2 statistic for the auditor fixed effect is insignificant with a chi2 
statistic (p value) of 4.07 (0.254). These results do not provide any evidence to suggest that 
the Big 4 firms have meaningfully different likelihoods of receiving SEC comment letters. 
But the likelihood of receiving a comment letter is not the only dimension on which 
clients of the Big 4 firms may differ in disclosure quality. Though all firms may be equally 
likely to receive a letter, letters of particular clienteles may be more severe. To test this 
possibility I estimate the following equations using the comment letter sample from Table 
2 Panel A: 
Severityi,t = β0 + βk * Controlsi,t + υ + ε                                    (6a) 
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Severityi,t = β0 + βk * Controlsi,t + υ + Auditor Fixed Effects + ε                    (6b) 
where Severity is one of four measures designed to capture the extent of issues contained 
in a comment letter and the costs of remediating them; Keys is the number of detailed issue 
keys (out of 215) identified in the letter, Types is the number of issue types (out of six) in 
the letter with at least one key noted, Rounds is the number of communications between 
the client and SEC before the conversation is closed, and Days is the number of days 
between the first and last letter in the conversation. Controls are the client-year versions of 
control variables used in equation (1) and all other variables are as defined for equations 
(5a) and (5b). Auditor Fixed Effects again capture aggregate differences in disclosure 
quality among clients of the Big 4 firms and I perform an F-test for the joint significance 
of the auditor indicator variables.  
Estimations of equations (6a) and (6b) are reported in Table 10 columns (3) through 
(10). The improvement in model performance by adding auditor fixed effects is negligible 
(i.e., the adjusted R2s are generally the same out to three decimal places). Similarly, the F 
stats for the joint hypothesis on the auditor indicator variables are all statistically 
insignificant except for columns (9) and (10) when Days is the dependent variable. This 
suggests that one of the costs associated with severe comment letters, the time invested in 
crafting responses, does differ meaningfully among the Big 4 firms. However, I note that 
the days it takes to resolve a comment letter conversation is a function of both the severity 
of the original comment letter and other idiosyncratic determinants of the time/preparation 
taken to respond to the SEC. Auditors are often heavily involved in the crafting of 
responses to the SEC. The auditor fixed effect on Days may be indicative of firm level 
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styles in the time given to crafting responses as much as the severity of the original 
comment letter itself.  
 These results broadly suggest that a) clients of any particular audit firm are no more 
likely to receive a comment letter, and b) clients of a particular audit firm receive letters 
no more severe than clients of any other firm. The only exception is Days in columns (9) 
and (10) which suggests that clients of a particular auditor firm do take a distinct number 
of days to resolve a comment letter conversation. However, the results do not support the 
broader idea that the major auditing firms have, in aggregate, substantially different 
disclosure quality. The results in Tables 4 through 6 should then be interpreted to mean 
that the Big 4 auditing firms have unique sets of disclosure deficiencies that they pass to 
their clients, although each of those deficiency sets appear to be equally severe. 
5.8 Auditor Style and Client Sophistication and Importance 
In Section 4.2 I note that clients of a particular auditor may not have equally adopted 
their auditor’s style. The results in Table 5 suggest those clients that have longer auditor 
tenure have more fully adopted this style and with it the style’s deficiencies. It is also 
plausible that client sophistication and/or independence may influence the relationship 
between auditor style (as measured by the presence of a common auditor) and common 
disclosure deficiencies (as measured by more similar SEC comment letters). Those clients 
that have more robust financial statement preparation units and/or more 
complex/idiosyncratic business practices (i.e., are more sophisticated) may not lean on 
their auditor as much in preparing financial statement disclosures and thus may have 
adopted their auditor’s style less. Therefore the presence of a common auditor among these 
firms may not engender the same disclosure similarities, and with them deficiencies. 
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Similarly, if the adoption of auditor style creates conflicts between the auditor and client 
then those clients that represent independence threats may have adopted the style less. That 
is to say that as auditors attempt to get unwilling clients to conform to their disclosure 
policies, they may be more likely to acquiescence to an important client and thus depart 
from the style, making the presence of a common auditor less meaningful for important 
clients. I explore both of these possibilities in this section. 
[Insert Table 11 Here] 
To test whether client sophistication influences the relationship between auditor style 
and common disclosure deficiencies, I estimate equation (1) for two subsamples split on 
the median value of a proxy for client sophistication.21 I proxy client sophistication using 
client size (total assets), reasoning that larger clients are more likely to have robust financial 
statement preparation units and engage in more complex/idiosyncratic business practices. 
The estimations of equation (1) for the subsamples are reported in Table 11 Panel A. 
Counter to the stated intuition, the association between auditor style and common 
disclosure deficiencies is present in the sophisticated/large client subsample and disappears 
completely in the unsophisticated/small client subsample. 
To test whether client importance influences the relationship between auditor style and 
common disclosure deficiencies, I estimate equation (1) for subsamples split on the median 
value of one of three proxies for client importance. The three proxies for importance are 
based on ratios of client fees to the total fees for the client’s audit office. For example, in 
Table 11 Panel B importance is measured as the client-year audit fee divided by all audit 
fees collected that year by the client’s audit office. Panel C uses similar logic but non-audit 
                                                 
21 When conducting median splits with a panel of pairwise observations I require that both of the 
observations in the pair be above (below) the sample median to make into the above (below) subsample. 
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fees instead of audit fees, and in Panel D I use total fees. Across panels Panels B through 
D the association between auditor style and common disclosure deficiencies appears in 
both the important and unimportant subsamples. The association is at its weakest in the 
Panel D unimportant subsample (where only one measure of comment letter similarity 
rejects the null hypothesis) and at its strongest in the Panel B important subsample (where 
all three measures of similarity reject the null). But generally, the results do not provide 
consistent evidence that the association between auditor style and common disclosure 
deficiencies is weaker/stronger for important/unimportant clients.      
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6. Conclusions 
Motived by the expansive economics and management literature on centralized 
decision-making (Alavi and Leidner 2001; Arcuri and Dari‐Mattiacci 2010; Graham, 
Harvey, and Puri 2015; Grant 1996; Hayek 1945; Sah and Stiglitz 1991), in this study, I 
document that auditor style, measured by the presence of a common auditor, is associated 
with common disclosure deficiencies, measured by receipt of similar comment letters. 
Letter-pairs with the same auditor are more similar in terms of the issue keys and types 
identified in the letter and the text the SEC reviewer uses to describe those issues. Comment 
letter similarity is stronger amongst those clients with long auditor tenure. And clients that 
change auditors between comment letters assume the disclosure deficiencies of the 
subsequent auditor, which helps to rule out a number of other plausible explanations for 
the results.  
To date, the auditor style literature has highlighted the increased financial statement 
comparability that it creates and the benefits of that comparability (Francis, Pinnuck, and 
Watanabe 2013; Francis and Wang 2016; Dhaliwal, Shenoy, and Williams 2016; Dhaliwal 
et al. 2016; Cai et al. 2016). And the broader literature on financial statement comparability 
lauds comparability’s benefits with little discussion of its costs.22 I document in this study 
that at least one source of financial statement comparability, auditor style, has notable 
costs. I make no statement about the net benefits of auditor style and financial statement 
comparability. I merely state that auditor style, possibly even financial statement 
                                                 
22 Some of this literature focuses on the benefits of financial statement comparability within the United 
States (De Franco, Kothari, and Verdi 2011; DeFond and Hung 2003). However, much of it focuses on the 
benefits of financial standard harmonization around IFRS which increases financial statement comparability 
(DeFond et al. 2011; Ozkan, Singer, and You 2012; Yip and Young 2012; Brochet, Jagolinzer, and Riedl 
2013; C. Wang 2014; Yu and Wahid 2014; Fang, Maffett, and Zhang 2015; Young and Zeng 2015). 
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comparability, is not a panacea. At least as far as auditor style is concerned, the 
comparability arises from centralized decision-making, which has predicable negative 
consequences.  
It is important that academics develop refined and nuanced conceptions of constructs, 
like auditor style, that reflect the greyness of the real world. Such understanding can only 
aid in the expansion of knowledge in our field. This study pushes the literature a step 
toward that goal with respect to auditor style. Further, the results of this study beg for more 
research on the negative consequences of auditor style and financial statement 
comparability itself. What are the potential costs? When are they greatest? When are they 
mitigated? And most importantly, under what circumstances may they eclipse the benefits? 
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APPENDIX A 
Variable Definitions 
This appendix provides definitions for the main regression variables. Variables appear in 
various letter-pairs analyses accompanied by the suffix Diff or Min. Diff means the variable is 
the absolute value of the difference for the variable between each comment letter in the letter-
pair. Min means the variable is the minimum value of the variable between each letter in the 
letter-pair. Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Unless stated 
otherwise, variables are measured at time t where t is the fiscal year of the first annual filing 
referenced by a comment letter. 
Comment Letter Sample 
Variable Definition 
Keys Number of issue keys (out of 215) noted in the comment letter. 
Types 
Number of individual issue types (out of 6) in the comment letter that have 
at least one issue key noted. 
Rounds 
Number of communications between the client and SEC before the 
conversation is closed.  
Days Number of days between the first and last letter in the conversation. 
Altman Z Altman (1968) Z Score. 
Auditor Tenure 
Number of years since the client-auditor combination first appears in Audit 
Analytics. 
Concurrent 
Restatement 
Indicator variable equal to one if the client filed a restatement during the 
fiscal year under review, and zero otherwise.  
Ext Financing 
External Financing measured as net common equity issuances minus 
dividends plus net long term and current debt issuances. 
Filings Number of SEC filings referenced in the comment letter. 
Firm Age Number of years since the client first appears in Compustat. 
High Volatility 
Indicator variable equal to one if the client's standard deviation of quarterly 
common equity prices for the prior twelve quarters is in the top quartile of 
the sample year, and zero otherwise. 
ICMW 
Indicator variable equal to one if the auditor noted a material weakness in 
internal controls, and zero otherwise. 
Litigation Risk 
Indicator variable equal to one if the firm is in any of the following 4-digit 
SIC codes: 2833-2836, 3570-3577, 3600-3674, 5200-5961, 7370-7374, and 
zero otherwise. 
LnMV 
Natural logarithm of market capitalization measured as the shares of 
common equity outstanding times the fiscal year's closing price per share. 
Loss Indicator variable equal to one if the firm has negative pretax income. 
MNA 
Indicator variable equal to one if the firm has non-zero acquisition costs, 
and zero otherwise. 
Restructure 
Indicator variable equal to one if the firm has nonzero restructuring costs, 
and zero otherwise. 
ROA Return on Assets measured as pretax income scaled by total assets. 
Sales Growth Percentage change in total sales. 
Segments  Number of business segments. 
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APPENDIX A CONTINUED 
Variable Definitions 
This appendix provides definitions for the main regression variables. Variables appear in 
various letter-pairs analyses accompanied by the suffix Diff or Min. Diff means the variable is 
the absolute value of the difference for the variable between each comment letter in the letter-
pair. Min means the variable is the minimum value of the variable between each letter in the 
letter-pair. Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Unless stated 
otherwise, variables are measured at time t where t is the fiscal year of the first annual filing 
referenced by a comment letter. 
Letter-Pairs Sample 
Variable Definition 
Same Auditor 
Indicator variable equal to one if both clients in a letter-pair 
have the same audit firm, and zero otherwise. 
Similar Keys 
Number of issue keys (out of 215) that appear in both letters 
in a letter-pair, scaled by the total number of keys noted in 
both letters. Values are multiplied by 100 for ease of 
interpretation. 
Similar Types 
Number of issue types (out of nine) where both letters in a 
letter-pair have at least one issue key noted for that type, 
scaled by the number of types in both letters that have at least 
one key noted. Values are multiplied by 100 for ease of 
interpretation. 
Similar Text 
The similarity of the textual content of the two comment 
letters in a pair using the Salton, Wong, & Yang (1975) 
Vector Space Model using word stemming and removing 
stop words and proper nouns. Values are multiplied by 100 
for ease of interpretation. 
Auditor Style and the Effect of Tenure 
Variable Definition 
Long Tenure 
Indicator variable equal to one if a both letters in the letter-
pair have been with their auditor for five or more years, and 
zero otherwise. 
Auditor Changes and Assuming Disclosure Deficiencies 
Variable Definition 
Switch 
Indicator variable equal to one if the two clients in the 
modified letter-pair have the same auditor, and zero 
otherwise. 
Self-Fulfilling Prophecy 
Variable Definition 
Prior Issue Auditor 
Indicator variable equal to one if, in the prior 365 days, 
another comment letter for a client with the same industry 
and audit firm had an issue noted for a particular type, and 
zero otherwise. 
Auditor Style and Overall Disclosure Quality 
Variable Definition 
Letter 
Indicator variable equal to one if the client received a letter referencing 
year t, and zero otherwise. 
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APPENDIX B 
Comment Letter Pairing Process 
This appendix describes the pairing process that creates the comment-letter-pair 
observations for the main analysis.  
The comment letter sample is first subdivided into groups based on a) the 2 digit SIC 
code of the client under review and b) the fiscal year of the first annual filing mentioned in 
the comment letter. Within each industry-year group all comment letters are matched to all 
other comment letters creating a panel of letter-pair observations. Note the sample is 
restricted so that a client may only have one comment letter for any one annual filing/fiscal 
year, so clients are never paired with themselves. This process produces a number of letter-
pair observations for each industry-year group equal to ∑ 𝑖 − 1𝑛𝑖=1 . The diagram below 
illustrates the process for an industry-year group that has four comment letters (n = 4) and 
six letter-pair observations. 
2 Digit SIC Code = 25 
Fiscal Year = 2008  
Letter 1 
Letter 2 
Letter 3 
Letter 4 
 
Generate Comment-Letter-Pair Observations 
Letter 1 Letter 2 Letter 3 Letter 4 
Letter 1 
 Letter 1 Letter 1  Letter 1 Letter 1  Letter 1 Letter 1  Letter 1 
Letter 2  Letter 2 
Letter 2 
 Letter 2 Letter 2  Letter 2 Letter 2  Letter 2 
Letter 3  Letter 3 Letter 3  Letter 3 
Letter 3 
 Letter 3 Letter 3  Letter 3 
Letter 4  Letter 4 Letter 4  Letter 4 Letter 4  Letter 4 Letter 4  Letter 4 
 
Resulting Comment-Letter-Pair Observations 
Letter 1 + Letter 2 
Letter 1 + Letter 3 
Letter 1 + Letter 4 
Letter 2 + Letter 3 
Letter 2 + Letter 4 
Letter 3 + Letter 4 
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APPENDIX C 
Comment Letter Pairing Process for the Auditor Changes Analysis 
This appendix describes the pairing process that creates the modified letter-pair sample 
used for the auditor changes analysis. Clients are grouped into Switcher and Non-Switcher 
subsamples based on whether or not they received comment letters for fiscal years audited 
by different audit firms. The exact requirements for each group are: 
Switchers 
 Must have at least two comment letters in the comment letter sample. 
 Must have exactly two audit firms for all comment letters. 
 
Non-Switchers 
 Must have exactly one audit firm for all comment letters. 
 
Clients that do not meet the requirements for either group (e.g., they received comment 
letters for three audit firms) are deleted. Switcher letters are paired to Non-Switcher letters 
if the Non-Switcher letter has a) the same industry and fiscal year and b) the Switcher’s 
post-change auditor. The Switch indicator variable then equals one for letter-pairs where 
the Switcher and Non-Switcher have the same audit firm. In other words, Switchers are 
paired with the clients of the auditor they change to, and the Switch indicator equals one 
for letters they receive after the change. The diagram below illustrates the process for one 
Switcher that has comment letters in two different years. 
2 Digit SIC Code = 25 
Fiscal Year = 2008  
2 Digit SIC Code = 25 
Fiscal Year = 2010 
Switcher   Non-Switchers Switcher   Non-Switchers 
Letter 1-Client A-Firm X  Letter 2-Client B-Firm X Letter 5-Client A-Firm Y  Letter 6-Client B-Firm X 
  Letter 3-Client C-Firm X    Letter 7-Client D-Firm Y 
   Letter 4-Client D-Firm Y    Letter 8-Client F-Firm Y 
 
Resulting Comment-Letter-Pair Observations 
Comment-Letter-Pair Switch 
Letter 1-Client A-Firm X + Letter 4-Client D-Firm Y 0 
Letter 5-Client A-Firm Y + Letter 7-Client D-Firm Y 1 
Letter 5-Client A-Firm Y + Letter 8-Client F-Firm Y 1 
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TABLE 1 
Sample Construction 
This table describes the steps required to construct/replicate the main comment letter sample.  
Step Desc Obs 
1 Retrieve the Audit Analytics Commlett file (June 2016 snapshot) and 
remove observations with missing company identifier (company_fkey) 
and conversation identifier (cl_con_id). 
273,333  
2 Remove entire conversations where the first correspondence is not 
initiated by the SEC (form_fkey = “UPLOAD”). 
218,582 
3 Remove entire conversations without a No Further Comment letter 
(iss_wholet_keys contains “|266|” in the final letter of the conversation). 
133,589 
4 Remove entire conversations where there is only one letter from the SEC 
(form_fkey = “UPLOAD”).. 
132,464 
5 Remove entire conversations with less than three letters. 130,558 
6 Remove entire conversations where the Audit Analytics Commlettconv 
file first letter date (first_letter_date) and/or last letter date 
(last_letter_date) do not match the first/last letter dates on the Commlett 
file (event_date). 
130,214 
7 Remove entire conversations where the first correspondence doesn’t 
reference a company annual filling (web_grp_fil_ref contains “10-K”, 
“10K”, “20-F” or “20F”). 
112,915 
8 Remove entire conversations where the first letter does not reference one 
of the six major issue types (iss_accrl_disc_keys, iss_dcic_keys 
iss_man_disc_keys, iss_regstatem_keys, iss_riskfact_keys or 
iss_othrdisc_keys not equal missing). 
111,517 
9 Compress the file down to the first correspondence for each 
conversation. 
22,567 
10 Merge the Commlett file and the Audit Analytics 
AuditOpin/AuditSox404 files. Comment letters are merged to the fiscal 
year associated with the first annual filling noted in the comment letter. 
14,429 
11 Merge the Commlett file with the Compustat Funda file. 13,771 
12 Remove observations with fiscal years before 2004 or after 2013. 12,932 
13 Remove observations with missing control data. 12,666 
14 Remove clients with a non-Big 4 auditor. 10,840 
15 Remove clients with less than $10M in assets. 10,830 
16 Remove observations where the client changed auditors during the year. 10,536 
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TABLE 2 
PANEL A 
Descriptive Statistics 
Comment Letter Sample 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the comment letter sample. The sample 
selection process is described in Table 1. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
Variable N Mean P10 P25 P50 P75 P90 SD 
Keys 10,536  5.957 2 3 5 8 12 3.980 
Types 10,536  2.540 1 2 3 3 4 0.975 
Altman Z 10,536  3.323 0.215 0.946 2.364 4.304 7.253 4.272 
Auditor Tenure 10,536  7.771 3 5 8 10 12 3.376 
Concurrent Restatement 10,536  0.070 0 0 0 0 0 0.254 
Ext Financing 10,536  -0.005 -0.056 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.020 0.065 
Filings 10,536  1.632 1 1 1 2 3 0.867 
Firm Age 10,536  23.519 7 11 18 32 53 16.759 
High Volatility 10,536  0.268 0 0 0 1 1 0.443 
ICMW 10,536  0.039 0 0 0 0 0 0.193 
Litigation Risk 10,536  0.211 0 0 0 0 1 0.408 
LnMV 10,536  7.596 5.338 6.342 7.545 8.760 9.971 1.760 
Loss 10,536  0.210 0 0 0 0 1 0.408 
MNA 10,536  0.452 0 0 0 1 1 0.498 
Restructure 10,536  0.332 0 0 0 1 1 0.471 
ROA 10,536  0.040 -0.070 0.007 0.048 0.103 0.171 0.140 
Sales Growth 10,536  0.121 -0.151 -0.023 0.070 0.192 0.391 0.343 
Segments 10,536  1.783 1 1 1 2 4 1.506 
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TABLE 2 
PANEL B 
Descriptive Statistics 
Letter-Pairs Sample 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the letter-pairs sample. All variables are defined in 
Appendix A. The comment letter pairing process is described in Appendix B.  
Variable N Mean P10 P25 P50 P75 P90 SD 
Same Auditor 247,782 0.270 0 0 0 1 1 0.444 
Similar Keys 247,782 11.039 0.000 0.000 10.526 16.667 25.000 9.678 
Similar Types 247,782 9.329 4.167 5.714 8.333 11.111 16.667 6.152 
Similar Text 244,409 57.894 49.216 53.142 57.710 62.273 66.667 7.396 
Altman Z Diff 247,782 3.701 0.129 0.532 1.759 4.639 9.639 5.099 
Altman Z Min 247,782 1.521 -0.354 0.274 1.297 2.764 4.271 2.641 
Auditor Tenure Diff 247,782 3.218 0 1 2 5 7 2.797 
Auditor Tenure Min 247,782 6.176 2 4 6 8 10 3.085 
Concurrent Restatement Diff 247,782 0.112 0 0 0 0 1 0.315 
Concurrent Restatement Min 247,782 0.004 0 0 0 0 0 0.066 
Ext Financing Diff 247,782 0.051 0.000 0.000 0.015 0.069 0.158 0.079 
Ext Financing Min 247,782 -0.030 -0.107 -0.037 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.061 
Filings Diff 247,782 0.773 0 0 1 1 2 0.866 
Filings Min 247,782 1.250 1 1 1 1 2 0.509 
Firm Age Diff 247,782 15.289 1 4 10 23 40 14.334 
Firm Age Min 247,782 14.358 5 8 12 17 25 10.717 
High Volatility Diff 247,782 0.351 0 0 0 1 1 0.477 
High Volatility Min 247,782 0.065 0 0 0 0 0 0.246 
ICMW Diff 247,782 0.066 0 0 0 0 0 0.248 
ICMW Min 247,782 0.002 0 0 0 0 0 0.045 
Litigation Risk Diff 247,782 0.201 0 0 0 0 1 0.401 
Litigation Risk Min 247,782 0.179 0 0 0 0 1 0.383 
LnMV Diff 247,782 1.898 0.289 0.738 1.582 2.742 3.963 1.458 
LnMV Min 247,782 6.608 4.791 5.562 6.610 7.577 8.414 1.436 
Loss Diff 247,782 0.335 0 0 0 1 1 0.472 
Loss Min 247,782 0.066 0 0 0 0 0 0.248 
MNA Diff 247,782 0.445 0 0 0 1 1 0.497 
MNA Min 247,782 0.237 0 0 0 0 1 0.425 
Restructure Diff 247,782 0.386 0 0 0 1 1 0.487 
Restructure Min 247,782 0.152 0 0 0 0 1 0.359 
ROA Diff 247,782 0.131 0.008 0.025 0.071 0.167 0.338 0.162 
ROA Min 247,782 -0.037 -0.264 -0.046 0.011 0.049 0.092 0.167 
Sales Growth Diff 247,782 0.300 0.028 0.073 0.170 0.351 0.664 0.406 
Sales Growth Min 247,782 -0.018 -0.268 -0.102 0.007 0.085 0.178 0.207 
Segments Diff 247,782 0.937 0 0 0 2 3 1.515 
Segments Min 247,782 1.278 1 1 1 1 2 0.824 
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TABLE 2 
PANEL C 
Descriptive Statistics 
Letter-Pairs Sample 
This table presents descriptive statistics and tests of differences in means for the letter-pairs 
sample split on the value of Same Auditor. All variables are defined in Appendix A. The 
comment letter pairing process is described in Appendix B.  
 Same Auditor = 0 Same Auditor = 1 Test of Difference in Means 
Variable N Mean SD N Mean SD Difference T Stat P Val 
Similar Keys 180,871 10.976 9.644 66,911 11.210 9.769 0.234 5.310 0.000 
Similar Types 180,871 9.305 6.136 66,911 9.393 6.195 0.088 3.133 0.003 
Similar Text 178,294 57.833 7.525 66,115 58.061 7.035 0.228 6.977 0.000 
Altman Z Diff 180,871 3.706 5.086 66,911 3.688 5.137 -0.017 -0.747 0.302 
Altman Z Min 180,871 1.525 2.637 66,911 1.511 2.651 -0.013 -1.109 0.216 
Auditor Tenure Diff 180,871 3.237 2.798 66,911 3.166 2.792 -0.070 -5.569 0.000 
Auditor Tenure Min 180,871 6.159 3.080 66,911 6.222 3.097 0.063 4.520 0.000 
Concurrent Restatement Diff 180,871 0.113 0.316 66,911 0.109 0.312 -0.003 -2.464 0.019 
Concurrent Restatement Min 180,871 0.004 0.066 66,911 0.005 0.068 0.000 0.854 0.277 
Ext Financing Diff 180,871 0.051 0.079 66,911 0.051 0.080 0.000 0.444 0.362 
Ext Financing Min 180,871 -0.031 0.062 66,911 -0.029 0.061 0.001 4.112 0.000 
Filings Diff 180,871 0.773 0.868 66,911 0.773 0.861 0.001 0.214 0.390 
Filings Min 180,871 1.248 0.508 66,911 1.255 0.512 0.006 2.734 0.010 
Firm Age Diff 180,871 15.462 14.396 66,911 14.822 14.154 -0.639 -9.937 0.000 
Firm Age Min 180,871 14.243 10.469 66,911 14.671 11.353 0.429 8.519 0.000 
High Volatility Diff 180,871 0.353 0.478 66,911 0.346 0.476 -0.007 -3.364 0.001 
High Volatility Min 180,871 0.065 0.246 66,911 0.064 0.245 -0.001 -0.477 0.356 
ICMW Diff 180,871 0.067 0.250 66,911 0.063 0.242 -0.004 -3.625 0.001 
ICMW Min 180,871 0.002 0.045 66,911 0.002 0.045 0.000 -0.068 0.398 
Litigation Risk Diff 180,871 0.204 0.403 66,911 0.193 0.395 -0.011 -5.894 0.000 
Litigation Risk Min 180,871 0.176 0.381 66,911 0.184 0.388 0.008 4.609 0.000 
LnMV Diff 180,871 1.907 1.462 66,911 1.873 1.449 -0.034 -5.209 0.000 
LnMV Min 180,871 6.612 1.438 66,911 6.597 1.431 -0.015 -2.300 0.028 
Loss Diff 180,871 0.335 0.472 66,911 0.333 0.471 -0.002 -1.060 0.227 
Loss Min 180,871 0.065 0.246 66,911 0.069 0.254 0.005 3.995 0.000 
MNA Diff 180,871 0.448 0.497 66,911 0.437 0.496 -0.010 -4.555 0.000 
MNA Min 180,871 0.240 0.427 66,911 0.228 0.420 -0.012 -6.147 0.000 
Restructure Diff 180,871 0.390 0.488 66,911 0.376 0.484 -0.015 -6.765 0.000 
Restructure Min 180,871 0.152 0.360 66,911 0.151 0.358 -0.002 -1.066 0.226 
ROA Diff 180,871 0.131 0.162 66,911 0.131 0.164 0.000 -0.192 0.392 
ROA Min 180,871 -0.036 0.167 66,911 -0.039 0.169 -0.003 -4.491 0.000 
Sales Growth Diff 180,871 0.299 0.404 66,911 0.303 0.412 0.004 2.098 0.044 
Sales Growth Min 180,871 -0.019 0.205 66,911 -0.015 0.212 0.003 3.585 0.001 
Segments Diff 180,871 0.949 1.529 66,911 0.903 1.477 -0.046 -6.803 0.000 
Segments Min 180,871 1.276 0.820 66,911 1.285 0.838 0.009 2.343 0.026 
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TABLE 3 
PANEL B 
Correlations 
Letter-Pairs Sample 
This table presents Pearson correlations 
between Same Auditor and the three 
measures of comment letter similarity 
using the letter-pairs sample. All variables 
are defined in Appendix A. The comment 
letter pairing process is described in 
Appendix B.  * denotes statistical 
significance at the p < 0.10 level or better 
(two-tailed test). 
  Variable 1 2 3 4 
1 Same Auditor 1.00    
2 Similar Keys 0.01* 1.00   
3 Similar Types 0.01* 0.27* 1.00  
4 Similar Text 0.01* 0.25* 0.26* 1.00 
 
 
  
63 
TABLE 4 
Auditor Style and SEC Comment Letter Similarity 
Letter-Pairs Sample 
This table presents tests of H1 using equation (1), the letter-pairs sample and 
the three measures of comment letter similarity. All variables are defined in 
Appendix A. The comment letter pairing process is described in Appendix 
B. T-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 
the p < 0.10, p < 0.05 and p < 0.01 levels (two-tailed test), respectively. A 
positive coefficient on Same Auditor is consistent with auditor style 
manifesting in common disclosure deficiencies as measured by more similar 
comment letters. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable =  Similar Keys Similar Types Similar Text 
Same Auditor 0.157 0.047 0.169 
  (3.61)*** (1.71)* (5.67)*** 
Altman Z Diff -0.007 -0.004 0.008 
 (-1.53) (-1.23) (2.23)** 
Altman Z Min 0.088 0.024 0.086 
 (9.36)*** (3.77)*** (12.70)*** 
Auditor Tenure Diff 0.031 0.018 0.051 
 (2.87)*** (2.62)*** (6.30)*** 
Auditor Tenure Min 0.016 0.029 0.063 
 (1.56) (4.28)*** (8.35)*** 
Concurrent Restatement Diff -0.255 0.055 -0.150 
 (-4.23)*** (1.34) (-3.60)*** 
Concurrent Restatement Min 0.180 -0.047 -0.330 
 (0.65) (-0.27) (-1.86)* 
Ext Financing Diff -0.048 -0.277 -0.978 
 (-0.16) (-1.39) (-5.00)*** 
Ext Financing Min -0.822 -0.615 -0.631 
 (-2.07)** (-2.43)** (-1.73)* 
Filings Diff 0.134 -0.558 -1.020 
 (6.24)*** (-41.04)*** (-62.81)*** 
Filings Min 2.928 -0.396 -0.253 
 (80.82)*** (-19.80)*** (-10.16)*** 
Firm Age Diff -0.004 -0.000 -0.008 
 (-2.59)*** (-0.01) (-7.84)*** 
Firm Age Min 0.025 0.009 0.024 
 (10.63)*** (5.99)*** (14.24)*** 
High Volatility Diff 0.253 0.018 -0.206 
 (6.00)*** (0.66) (-6.77)*** 
High Volatility Min 0.563 0.190 -0.309 
 (6.53)*** (3.38)*** (-5.38)*** 
ICMW Diff -1.446 -1.233 -0.508 
 (-19.76)*** (-25.07)*** (-10.40)*** 
ICMW Min -1.573 -1.926 -0.739 
 (-4.15)*** (-8.53)*** (-3.09)*** 
Litigation Risk Diff -0.846 -0.266 -0.601 
 (-13.03)*** (-6.66)*** (-13.51)*** 
Litigation Risk Min 0.188 0.622 2.391 
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 (2.16)** (11.44)*** (38.34)*** 
LnMV Diff -0.460 -0.153 -0.334 
 (-28.92)*** (-15.07)*** (-28.63)*** 
LnMV Min -0.296 -0.135 -0.162 
 (-14.39)*** (-10.32)*** (-9.76)*** 
Loss Diff 0.370 -0.314 -0.419 
 (7.11)*** (-9.70)*** (-11.25)*** 
Loss Min 0.474 -0.303 -0.616 
 (4.57)*** (-4.81)*** (-8.82)*** 
MNA Diff -0.228 -0.253 -0.299 
 (-4.80)*** (-8.14)*** (-8.59)*** 
MNA Min 0.019 -0.377 -0.269 
 (0.32) (-10.18)*** (-6.60)*** 
Restructure Diff -0.072 -0.041 -0.369 
 (-1.58) (-1.39) (-10.70)*** 
Restructure Min 0.469 0.184 0.023 
 (7.09)*** (4.33)*** (0.49) 
ROA Diff -3.865 -0.474 -2.182 
 (-14.17)*** (-2.59)*** (-10.96)*** 
ROA Min -3.541 -1.220 -2.344 
 (-11.75)*** (-6.07)*** (-10.96)*** 
Sales Growth Diff -0.335 0.024 -0.445 
 (-6.66)*** (0.73) (-13.69)*** 
Sales Growth Min 0.652 0.809 0.749 
 (6.38)*** (11.35)*** (10.85)*** 
Segments Diff -0.084 0.039 -0.004 
 (-5.18)*** (3.68)*** (-0.31) 
Segments Min -0.102 0.055 0.050 
 (-3.68)*** (3.03)*** (2.58)*** 
Constant 5.196 10.992 61.718 
 (3.17)*** (15.30)*** (85.59)*** 
Industry and Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y 
Robust Standard Errors 
Clustered by Unique Gvkey Pair 
Y Y Y 
Observations 247,782  247,782  244,409  
R2 0.081 0.037 0.236 
Adjusted R2 0.081 0.037 0.236 
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TABLE 5 
Auditor Style and the Effect of Tenure 
Letter-Pairs Sample 
This table presents tests of H2 using equation (2). Long Tenure is an indicator equal to one if both 
letters in the letter-pair have been with their auditor for five or more years. All other variables are 
defined in Appendix A. The comment letter pairing process is described in Appendix B. T-
statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the p < 0.10, p < 0.05 
and p < 0.01 levels (two-tailed test), respectively. A positive (negative) coefficient on Long 
Tenure in columns (1) through (3) ((4) through (6)) is consistent with clients converging 
(diverging) in style and deficiencies as auditor tenure increases. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Sample Restriction =  Same Auditor = 1 Same Auditor = 0 
Dependent Variable =  
Similar 
Keys 
Similar 
Types 
Similar 
Text 
Similar 
Keys 
Similar 
Types 
Similar 
Text 
Long Tenure 0.010 0.093 0.109 -0.088 0.046 -0.134 
  (0.13) (1.74)* (2.02)** (-1.80)* (1.44) (-3.85)*** 
Altman Z Diff -0.015 0.001 0.014 -0.003 -0.006 0.005 
 (-1.73)* (0.22) (2.32)** (-0.61) (-1.57) (1.28) 
Altman Z Min 0.091 0.027 0.089 0.087 0.023 0.082 
 
(4.76)*** (2.23)** (6.61)*** 
(8.03)*** (3.03)*** 
(10.48)**
* 
Concurrent Restatement 
Diff -0.204 0.047 -0.152 -0.272 0.061 -0.146 
 (-1.75)* (0.61) (-1.94)* (-3.85)*** (1.27) (-2.98)*** 
Concurrent Restatement 
Min 0.570 0.149 -0.164 0.023 -0.123 -0.398 
 (1.06) (0.40) (-0.47) (0.07) (-0.63) (-1.92)* 
Ext Financing Diff 0.910 -0.579 -1.058 -0.458 -0.182 -1.013 
 (1.55) (-1.53) (-2.90)*** (-1.29) (-0.78) (-4.37)*** 
Ext Financing Min -0.504 -0.639 0.306 -0.985 -0.614 -1.028 
 (-0.64) (-1.29) (0.59) (-2.13)** (-2.07)** (-2.27)** 
Filings Diff 0.061 -0.535 -1.056 0.160 -0.567 -1.011 
 (1.44) (-20.07)*** 
(-
37.46)*** (6.42)*** (-35.85)*** 
(-
51.49)*** 
Filings Min 3.070 -0.355 -0.218 2.874 -0.413 -0.273 
 (43.51)*** (-9.26)*** (-4.91)*** (68.05)*** (-17.60)*** (-9.21)*** 
Firm Age Diff -0.001 0.003 -0.008 -0.004 -0.000 -0.007 
 (-0.26) (1.38) (-4.01)*** (-2.28)** (-0.24) (-5.44)*** 
Firm Age Min 0.026 0.013 0.025 0.027 0.009 0.030 
 (5.85)*** (4.68)*** (7.71)*** (9.82)*** (5.40)*** 
(15.22)**
* 
High Volatility Diff 0.429 -0.046 -0.202 0.189 0.043 -0.201 
 (5.20)*** (-0.88) (-3.70)*** (3.87)*** (1.36) (-5.52)*** 
High Volatility Min 0.853 0.082 -0.210 0.457 0.234 -0.332 
 (4.99)*** (0.76) (-1.81)* (4.57)*** (3.54)*** (-5.03)*** 
ICMW Diff -1.351 -1.129 -0.464 -1.491 -1.270 -0.537 
 (-9.23)*** (-11.61)*** (-4.88)*** 
(-
17.67)*** (-22.29)*** (-9.44)*** 
ICMW Min -0.591 -0.992 -0.546 -1.952 -2.267 -0.807 
 (-0.80) (-1.80)* (-1.12) (-4.42)*** (-9.84)*** (-2.95)*** 
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Litigation Risk Diff -0.932 -0.200 -0.623 -0.814 -0.290 -0.590 
 (-7.19)*** (-2.52)** (-6.98)*** 
(-
10.86)*** (-6.25)*** 
(-
11.47)*** 
Litigation Risk Min 0.223 0.651 2.307 0.181 0.621 2.433 
 (1.30) (6.19)*** 
(19.28)**
* (1.80)* (9.77)*** 
(33.47)**
* 
LnMV Diff -0.462 -0.143 -0.337 -0.456 -0.156 -0.324 
 
(-
14.98)*** (-7.29)*** 
(-
16.16)*** 
(-
24.54)*** (-13.06)*** 
(-
22.99)*** 
LnMV Min -0.323 -0.116 -0.139 -0.281 -0.141 -0.162 
 (-7.91)*** (-4.59)*** (-4.69)*** 
(-
11.83)*** (-9.19)*** (-8.03)*** 
Loss Diff 0.419 -0.384 -0.399 0.355 -0.294 -0.444 
 (4.12)*** (-6.22)*** (-5.98)*** (5.87)*** (-7.72)*** (-9.93)*** 
Loss Min 0.182 -0.419 -0.752 0.584 -0.270 -0.594 
 (0.91) (-3.43)*** (-5.61)*** (4.81)*** (-3.67)*** (-7.27)*** 
MNA Diff -0.304 -0.322 -0.411 -0.205 -0.230 -0.266 
 (-3.30)*** (-5.41)*** (-6.79)*** (-3.71)*** (-6.30)*** (-6.33)*** 
MNA Min -0.084 -0.453 -0.412 0.050 -0.352 -0.228 
 (-0.72) (-6.31)*** (-5.31)*** (0.74) (-8.14)*** (-4.78)*** 
Restructure Diff -0.034 0.002 -0.403 -0.077 -0.048 -0.331 
 (-0.38) (0.03) (-6.70)*** (-1.45) (-1.41) (-8.10)*** 
Restructure Min 0.514 0.197 0.056 0.465 0.193 0.049 
 (3.94)*** (2.38)** (0.61) (6.07)*** (3.92)*** (0.93) 
ROA Diff -3.953 -0.933 -2.379 -3.861 -0.289 -2.113 
 (-7.45)*** (-2.69)*** (-6.62)*** 
(-
12.14)*** (-1.34) (-8.86)*** 
ROA Min -3.760 -1.742 -2.370 -3.502 -1.039 -2.407 
 (-6.46)*** (-4.62)*** (-6.03)*** (-9.95)*** (-4.37)*** (-9.44)*** 
Sales Growth Diff -0.349 0.089 -0.358 -0.332 -0.008 -0.515 
 (-3.53)*** (1.42) (-5.76)*** (-5.70)*** (-0.21) 
(-
13.59)*** 
Sales Growth Min 0.329 0.925 0.696 0.772 0.753 0.718 
 (1.69)* (6.61)*** (5.40)*** (6.45)*** (9.13)*** (8.76)*** 
Segments Diff -0.155 0.030 0.010 -0.057 0.045 -0.003 
 (-4.84)*** (1.42) (0.46) (-3.05)*** (3.61)*** (-0.24) 
Segments Min -0.187 0.057 0.091 -0.071 0.056 0.038 
 (-3.30)*** (1.59) (2.12)** (-2.24)** (2.70)*** (1.80)* 
Constant 7.534 12.347 63.056 3.923 10.098 60.996 
  (3.04)*** (12.85)*** 
(52.80)**
* (1.58) (13.75)*** 
(75.51)**
* 
Industry and Year Fixed 
Effects 
Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Robust Standard Errors 
Clustered by Unique Gvkey 
Pair 
Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 66,911  66,911  66,115  180,871  180,871  178,294  
R2 0.086 0.038 0.266 0.080 0.038 0.227 
Adjusted R2 0.084 0.037 0.264 0.080 0.037 0.227 
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TABLE 6 
Auditor Changes and Assuming Disclosure Deficiencies 
Switching Letter-Pairs Sample 
This table presents tests of H3 using equation (3), the modified letter-pairs 
sample and the three measures of comment letter similarity. All variables 
are defined in Appendix A. Each pair contains one letter for a client that 
changed auditors between comment letters and one letter for a client that 
never changed auditors. The selection and pairing of changing and non-
changing letters is described in Appendix C. T-statistics are in parentheses. 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the p < 0.10, p < 0.05 and p 
< 0.01 levels (two-tailed test), respectively. A positive coefficient on Switch 
is consistent with clients assuming the deficiencies of a new auditor after 
switching as measured by comment letters that are more similar to the 
subsequent auditor's existing clients. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable =  Similar Keys Similar Types Similar Text 
Switch 1.314 0.516 0.914 
  (3.40)*** (2.33)** (2.46)** 
Altman Z Diff 0.023 0.025 -0.046 
 (0.88) (1.20) (-1.96)* 
Altman Z Min 0.062 0.133 0.138 
 (1.05) (3.20)*** (2.80)*** 
Auditor Tenure Diff 0.057 0.085 0.078 
 (1.21) (2.71)*** (1.81)* 
Auditor Tenure Min 0.046 -0.015 0.039 
 (0.71) (-0.35) (0.66) 
Concurrent Restatement Diff -0.604 -0.252 -0.092 
 (-1.98)** (-1.20) (-0.32) 
Concurrent Restatement Min -1.357 0.250 -0.318 
 (-1.23) (0.24) (-0.25) 
Ext Financing Diff -0.013 1.963 3.033 
 (-0.01) (1.50) (2.25)** 
Ext Financing Min 0.318 1.699 6.938 
 (0.13) (0.95) (3.47)*** 
Filings Diff 0.016 -0.635 -1.047 
 (0.12) (-7.99)*** (-8.80)*** 
Filings Min 2.687 -0.616 -0.419 
 (12.77)*** (-5.19)*** (-2.20)** 
Firm Age Diff 0.002 -0.004 -0.007 
 (0.19) (-0.75) (-0.84) 
Firm Age Min 0.036 0.007 0.039 
 (2.61)*** (0.79) (3.24)*** 
High Volatility Diff -0.357 -0.110 -0.281 
 (-1.41) (-0.63) (-1.19) 
High Volatility Min -0.822 -0.939 -0.757 
 (-1.73)* (-3.05)*** (-1.76)* 
ICMW Diff -0.833 -1.044 -0.730 
 (-2.29)** (-4.31)*** (-2.18)** 
ICMW Min 0.403 -1.243 -2.287 
 (0.23) (-1.94)* (-1.67)* 
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Litigation Risk Diff -0.330 0.704 -0.225 
 (-0.71) (2.41)** (-0.52) 
Litigation Risk Min 0.399 1.568 2.988 
 (0.67) (4.48)*** (5.63)*** 
LnMV Diff -0.474 -0.256 -0.355 
 (-4.91)*** (-4.12)*** (-3.81)*** 
LnMV Min -0.212 -0.376 -0.293 
 (-1.70)* (-4.56)*** (-2.56)** 
Loss Diff 0.360 -0.432 0.209 
 (1.22) (-2.26)** (0.78) 
Loss Min -0.861 -1.145 -0.061 
 (-1.50) (-3.34)*** (-0.11) 
MNA Diff -0.125 -0.261 -0.070 
 (-0.47) (-1.53) (-0.31) 
MNA Min -0.557 -0.161 -0.617 
 (-1.60) (-0.70) (-2.03)** 
Restructure Diff -0.139 0.298 -0.223 
 (-0.51) (1.72)* (-0.90) 
Restructure Min 0.832 0.270 0.160 
 (2.05)** (1.07) (0.40) 
ROA Diff -3.709 -2.007 -2.085 
 (-2.09)** (-1.66)* (-1.21) 
ROA Min -2.272 -2.569 -2.966 
 (-1.20) (-2.01)** (-1.64) 
Sales Growth Diff 0.678 0.358 -0.660 
 (2.03)** (1.58) (-2.08)** 
Sales Growth Min 1.607 -0.198 0.788 
 (2.53)** (-0.52) (1.42) 
Segments Diff -0.309 0.131 0.129 
 (-3.47)*** (2.03)** (1.43) 
Segments Min 0.034 0.234 0.338 
 (0.23) (2.29)** (2.29)** 
Constant 5.131 12.311 70.154 
 (2.38)** (6.02)*** (16.27)*** 
Industry and Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y 
Robust Standard Errors 
Clustered by Unique Comment-
Letter-Pair 
Y Y Y 
Observations 7,307  7,307  3,554  
R2 0.085 0.076 0.293 
Adjusted R2 0.074 0.065 0.276 
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TABLE 7 
Auditor Style and SEC Comment Letter Similarity by Issue Type 
Letter-Pairs Sample 
This table presents tests of H1 using equation (1), the letter-pairs sample, and the six sub measures of 
Similar Keys categorized by type. Each dependent variable is analogous to Similar Keys except that only 
issues from a particular issue type are counted. The sample is restricted to those letters that have at least 
one issue key noted for a particular type. Coefficients on Same Auditor have been standardized to 
facilitate comparisons across models. All other variables are defined in Appendix A. The comment letter 
pairing process is described in Appendix B. T-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote statistical 
significance at the p < 0.10, p < 0.05 and p < 0.01 levels (two-tailed test), respectively. A positive 
coefficient on Same Auditor is consistent with auditor style manifesting in common disclosure 
deficiencies as measured by more similar comment letters for a particular type of issue. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Issue Type = 
Accounting 
Rule 
MD&A 
Internal 
Control 
Risk 
Factor 
Regulatory 
Filing 
Other 
Same Auditor 0.006 0.007 -0.048 -0.015 -0.019 0.005 
  (2.30)** (2.59)*** (-1.41) (-1.07) (-1.30) (1.99)** 
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry and Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Robust Standard Errors 
Clustered by Unique Gvkey 
Pair 
Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 163,399 119,117 832 4,772 4,333 165,463 
R2 0.090 0.056 0.239 0.142 0.090 0.098 
Adjusted R2 0.089 0.055 0.166 0.127 0.070 0.098 
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TABLE 8 
Comment Letter Similarity and the Self-Fulfilling Prophecy 
Comment Letter Sample 
This table presents tests of the temporal version of the self-fulfilling prophecy using logistic 
estimations of equation (4) and the comment letter sample. The dependent variable is an 
indicator equal to one if the comment letter had at least one issue key noted for a particular issue 
type. Prior Issue Auditor is an indicator equal to one if another client with the same industry and 
with the same auditor had a letter with at least one issue key noted for that type in the prior 365 
days. All other variables are defined in Appendix A. T-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and 
*** denote statistical significance at the p < 0.10, p < 0.05 and p < 0.01 levels (two-tailed test), 
respectively. A positive coefficient on Prior Issue Auditor is consistent with SEC comment letter 
reviewers being more likely to identify an issue for a particular type if another client with the 
same industry and auditor had an issue of that type in the previous 365 days. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Issue Type = 
Accounting 
Rule 
MD&A 
Internal 
Control 
Risk 
Factor 
Regulatory 
Filing 
Other 
Prior Issue Auditor 0.390 0.110 -0.032 -0.009 -0.227 -0.755 
  (0.82) (0.46) (-0.18) (-0.06) (-1.61) (-1.81)* 
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry and Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Robust Standard Errors 
Clustered by Gvkey 
Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 9,610  10,058  8,212  9,728  9,466  9,436  
Pseudo R2 0.334 0.153 0.174 0.153 0.151 0.194 
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TABLE 9 
Auditor Style for Non-Big 4 Clients 
Letter-Pairs Sample for Non-Big 4 Clients 
This table presents tests of the intuition that the association between 
auditor style and common disclosure deficiencies should be weaker 
among Non-Big 4 audit firms. These tests use equation (1) and a 
letter-pairs sample constructed using Non-Big 4 clients that received 
SEC comment letters. All variables are defined in Appendix A. The 
comment letter pairing process is described in Appendix B. T-
statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the p < 0.10, p < 0.05 and p < 0.01 levels (two-tailed 
test), respectively. A positive coefficient on Same Auditor is 
consistent with auditor style manifesting in common disclosure 
deficiencies as measured by more similar comment letters. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable =  
Similar 
Keys 
Similar 
Types 
Similar 
Text 
Same Auditor -0.517 0.129 0.458 
  (-1.76)* (0.73) (2.57)** 
Controls Y Y Y 
Industry and Year Fixed 
Effects Y Y Y 
Robust Standard Errors 
Clustered by Unique Gvkey 
Pair 
Y Y Y 
Observations 9,710  9,710  9,494  
R2 0.207 0.121 0.287 
Adjusted R2 0.200 0.114 0.280 
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TABLE 10 
Auditor Style and Overall Disclosure Quality 
Full Compustat and Comment Letter Samples 
This table presents tests of whether overall disclosure quality, as measured by receipt of and/or more 
severe SEC comment letters, is different among the Big 4 clienteles. Columns (1) and (2) use equations 
(5a) and the full Compustat sample of Big 4 clients. Columns (3) through (10) use equations (6a) and 
(6b) and the comment letter sample from Table 2 Panel A. All variables are defined in Appendix A. A 
statistically significant Chi2/F statistic for the audit firm fixed effects is consistent with different levels of 
overall disclosure quality among the Big 4 firms. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Sample = Full Compustat Comment Letter 
Dependent Variable =  Letter Keys Types Rounds Days 
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry and Year Fixed 
Effects 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Audit Firm Fixed Effects N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y 
Robust Standard Errors 
Clustered by Unique 
Gvkey Pair 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 28,290  28,290  10,536  10,536  10,536  10,536  10,536  10,536  10,536  10,536  
R2   0.205 0.206 0.136 0.136 0.068 0.069 0.098 0.099 
Adjusted R2   0.198 0.198 0.129 0.129 0.060 0.060 0.090 0.091 
Pseudo R2 0.061 0.061                 
Chi2 / F Stat for Auditor 
Fixed Effect 
4.07 0.53 0.36 0.75 2.84 
P Value 0.254 0.662 0.779 0.523 0.037 
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TABLE 11 
Auditor Style and Client Sophistication and Importance 
Letter-Pairs Sample 
This table presents tests of the intuition that the association between auditor style and common 
disclosure deficiencies may vary with client sophistication and/or importance. These tests use 
equation (1) and subsamples of the letter-pairs sample split on proxies for sophistication and 
importance. In Panel A, client sophistication is proxied by above/below median levels of client 
total assets. In Panel B, client importance is proxied by above/below median percentage of a 
client audit fees to total audit fees for the client’s audit office. In Panel C, client importance is 
proxied by above/below median percentage of a client non-audit fees to total non-audit fees for 
the client’s audit office. In Panel D, client importance is proxied by above/below median 
percentage of a client total fees to total fees for the client’s audit office. All variables are defined 
in Appendix A. The comment letter pairing process is described in Appendix B. T-statistics are in 
parentheses. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the p < 0.10, p < 0.05 and p < 0.01 levels 
(two-tailed test), respectively. A positive coefficient on Same Auditor is consistent with auditor 
style manifesting in common disclosure deficiencies as measured by more similar comment 
letters. 
 
Panel A: Total Assets             
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Sample Restriction =  Above Median Below Median 
Dependent Variable =  
Similar 
Keys 
Similar 
Types 
Similar 
Text 
Similar 
Keys 
Similar 
Types 
Similar 
Text 
Same Auditor 0.296 0.137 0.252 0.088 0.023 0.073 
  (3.43)*** (2.51)** (4.29)*** (1.18) (0.50) (1.36) 
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry and Year Fixed 
Effects 
Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Robust Standard Errors 
Clustered by Unique 
Gvkey Pair 
Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 70,326  70,326  68,347  76,292  76,292  75,576  
R2 0.101 0.036 0.298 0.083 0.059 0.183 
Adjusted R2 0.100 0.034 0.297 0.082 0.058 0.182 
 
 
Panel B: Percentage of Office Audit Fees  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Sample Restriction =  Above Median Below Median 
Dependent Variable =  
Similar 
Keys 
Similar 
Types 
Similar 
Text 
Similar 
Keys 
Similar 
Types 
Similar 
Text 
Same Auditor 0.172 0.201 0.249 0.291 0.036 0.107 
  (1.87)* (3.31)*** (3.80)*** (3.61)*** (0.70) (2.05)** 
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry and Year Fixed 
Effects 
Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Robust Standard Errors 
Clustered by Unique 
Gvkey Pair 
Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 56,841 56,841 55,582 71,704 71,704 71,091 
R2 0.090 0.037 0.256 0.089 0.048 0.224 
Adjusted R2 0.088 0.036 0.255 0.088 0.047 0.223 
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Panel C: Percentage of Office Non Audit Fees 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Sample Restriction =  Above Median Below Median 
Dependent Variable =  
Similar 
Keys 
Similar 
Types 
Similar 
Text 
Similar 
Keys 
Similar 
Types 
Similar 
Text 
Same Auditor 0.061 0.132 0.184 0.271 -0.003 0.160 
  (0.69) (2.29)** (2.93)*** (3.26)*** (-0.06) (2.78)*** 
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry and Year Fixed 
Effects 
Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Robust Standard Errors 
Clustered by Unique 
Gvkey Pair 
Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 58,644 58,644 57,230 67,176 67,176 66,565 
R2 0.099 0.035 0.253 0.095 0.049 0.189 
Adjusted R2 0.098 0.034 0.252 0.093 0.047 0.188 
 
 
Panel D: Percentage of Office Total Fees 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Sample Restriction =  Above Median Below Median 
Dependent Variable =  
Similar 
Keys 
Similar 
Types 
Similar 
Text 
Similar 
Keys 
Similar 
Types 
Similar 
Text 
Same Auditor 0.120 0.192 0.225 0.240 0.011 0.058 
  (1.31) (3.16)*** (3.44)*** (3.01)*** (0.22) (1.13) 
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry and Year Fixed 
Effects 
Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Robust Standard Errors 
Clustered by Unique 
Gvkey Pair 
Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 56,477 56,477 55,173 72,424 72,424 71,836 
R2 0.094 0.036 0.247 0.090 0.050 0.228 
Adjusted R2 0.092 0.034 0.246 0.089 0.049 0.227 
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